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Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the 
Limits of Judicial Review* 
JONATHAN L. ENTIN** 
The term "separation of powers" appears nowhere in the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, the division of federal authority among three distinct but interde-
pendent branches is one of the defining features of the American governmental 
system. Although designed to promote both liberty and efficiency, this structure 
affords ample opportunity for interbranch conflict. Perhaps because, as de Toc-
queville presciently observed, "[s]carcely any political question arises in the 
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question," 1 the 
Supreme Court recently has addressed an unusually large number of disputes 
concerning the respective powers of Congress and the President.2 This has oc-
curred even though the New Deal apparently had transformed the seemingly 
arcane subject of separation of powers into a topic of primarily antiquarian 
interest. 3 
The renewed attention to the problem of government structure was largely 
stimulated by three cases that arose from the Watergate affair. The first, 
United States v. Nixon, 4 upheld the validity of the special prosecutor's subpoena 
to the President for tape recordings of White House conversations relating to 
• " Jonathan L. Entin, 1990. 
** Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. 
Earlier versions of this Article were presented at Oberlin College, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law, and the Southwestern Political Science Association. The author thanks Melvyn Durchslag, Arthur English, 
Peter Gerhart, Erik Jensen, Calvin Jillson, Harold Krent, William Marshall, Richard Myers, and Michael 
Solimine for helpful comments on previous drafts and Elizabeth Ashley for diligent research assistance. 
I. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 {P. Bradley ed. 1945). 
2. The relationship between Congress and the President has not been the only aspect of government struc-
ture that has occupied the Court's attention during this period. Two other problems also have generated significant 
litigation. The first relates to the constitutionality of assigning the power to adjudicate legal claims to tribunals 
whose members Jack the tenure and salary protections enjoyed by article Ill judges. In Northern Pipeline Constr. 
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 {1982), the Court, with three dissents and no majority opinion, 
invalidated a statutory provision conferring jurisdiction over all matters arising under the bankruptcy Jaws upon 
article I judges. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 {1985), the Court upheld the 
assignment of a limited class of disputes under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act to 
mandatory arbitration, subject to judicial review only for "fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct," 7 
U.S.C. § 136a{c){J)(D){ii) {1982). The Thomas decision was unanimous, although the opinion of the Court 
attracted only a bare majority of the Justices. And in Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 
833 { 1986), a seven-member majority subscribing to a single opinion upheld an administrative regulation permit-
ting adjudication of state Jaw counterclaims in agency reparation proceedings. See generally Fallon, OJ Legislative 
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article Ill, I 01 HARV. L. REv. 916 { 1988); Sa ph ire & Solimine, Shoring 
Up Article lll: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U.L. REv. 85 { 1988). 
Another line of cases addresses the problem of federalism and the role of the states in our constitutional 
system. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 { 1976), the Court ruled that the tenth amendment 
prevented Congress from applying federal wage and hour regulations to public employees at the state and local 
level who were engaged in traditional government functions. After Jess than a decade during which the Court 
steadily narrowed the reach of this principle, the decision was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 { 1985). See generally Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for 
a Third Century, 88 CaLUM. L. REv. I, I 0-22 { 1988); Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. 
L. REv. 1709, 1712-33 { 1985). 
3. See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 437-52 {1987). 
4. 418 u.s. 683 { 1974). 
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!~ J 
l7S OHJu STA'l'E LAIY JOURNAL (VoL Si:J7s 
the illegal entry into the headquarters of the Democratic ]\I a tiona] Comm. 
in June !972, a ruling that led ineluctably to Mr. I';Jixon's resignation ;nee 
office two weeks later. The next case, Buckley v. Valeo, 5 held unconstituti rom 
h ~ 1 . b ~ h ,., d I ~l . onaJ t e process ror se ectmg mem ers or t e re era E ectwn Commission 
d , , f d . . · an agency _c~eate as p~rt 01 t;~e statut_ory :·e orms passe . m the wake of perceived 
fund-raising abuses m President Nixon s 1972 reelectiOn campaign. The third 
Nixo:1 v._ Adn_tinistrator of Gener~I_Services,6 _rejected a facial challenge to th~ 
constitutionality of a statute depnvmg Mr. Nixon of control of his presidential 
papers. 
Separation of powers disputes have continued to occupy a central place 0 
the Court's docket during this decade. Among the more notable cases have been tho~e invalidating the legislative veto7 and the central feature of a highly publi~ 
cized effort to reduce the federal deficit, 9 and another upholding the indepen-
dent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. 9 Although these deci-
sions have generated controversy, they have not provoked constitutional and 
political crises. 10 
Nevertheless, this line of cases has left us in an unsatisfactory position. The 
Court has failed to articulate a consistent methodology for analyzing separation 
of powers disputes involving the legislative and executive branches. Sometimes 
it follows a formal approach analogous to the " 'strict' in theory and fatal in 
fact" scrutiny in equal protection cases.ll .1\t other times it uses a more func-
tional ap]Hoach focusing upon checks and balances. During the 1980s, the selec-
tion of the analytical method has determined the outcome of eve1y legislative-
executive controversy. The inconsistencies in outcomes and methodology are 
hardly unique to separation of powers p;-ob!ems/2 but they suggest the need for 
greater analytical clarity than the Comt thus far has demonstrated. 
At a more fundamental level, the quest for ultimate judicial resolution of 
constitutional turf battles between Congress and tho:- President hc,s undesirable 
·~onsequences for the nation as a ·whole. Separation of powers dispuies implicate 
fundamental questions respecting the role of government, questions that rarely 
receive detailed attention in Suprc;me Court opinions . .E>rcessive reliance upon 
5. 424 U.S. I ( 1976) (per curiam). 
6. 433 U.S. 425 ( 1977). 
7. hnmigration & J··.Jaturalizalion Serv. v. Chadha, 461 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Con:;urner:; L-1nion of 
U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (per curiam), afFd mem. sub nom. Un;ted Stale; 
Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 ( 1983); Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 19821. a!!"d 
mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. I 2 I 6 (I 983). 
3. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
9. Morrison v. Olson, I 08 S. Ct. 2597 ( !98e). The rcl.:;vani portions of the Ethics in Gm'ernmcnt :-\l..i .lf!.: 
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599 (Supp. V 1987). 
10. See Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separalion-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish /nl'on-
sistency?, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 488, 489 (I 987). 
I I. Gunther, The Supreme Court, !971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine 011 a Changing 
Court: .4 Madel for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 1-!ARV. L. REv. I, 8 (!972). . 
12. A notable illustration in a more contentious area involves the dioplay of religious symbols ''" publiC 
property. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 ( 1 984) (allowing creche with secular decoration> I """ 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (I 989) (disallowing unad•:rned 
creche but permitting menorah). See generally Marshall, '"We Know !I !t"hen We See /t""(:j The Supre/11<" l '"'" 
and Establishmelll, 59 :S. CAL. L. REv. 495 ( 1986j. 
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the Court deceives us into thinking that these disputes are purely constitutional 
in nature and that only the Justices can resolve them. Demanding judicial reso-
lution improperly diminishes the role of the political branches in interpreting 
the Constitution, and emphasizing the constitutionality of a proposal diverts at-
tention from its often dubious wisdom. 
The limited utility of judicial review m legislative-executive conflicts has 
been demonstrated numerous times. For example, the courts played no role in 
the controversy over the Tenure of Office Act/ 3 probably the most severe sepa-
ration of powers problem in our history. Indeed, congressional concerns about 
the constitutionality of that statute contributed to the acquittal of Andrew 
Johnson in the only presidential impeachment trial ever conducted by the Sen-
ate.14 The Act was amended in 1869 during the first weeks of the Grant admin-
istration and repealed, after perfunctory debate, in 1887 by a Congress which 
recognized the unfortunate experiment as the great national embarrassment 
that it was. 15 
Similarly, the judiciary has served as a bystander throughout the contro-
versy over the War Powers Resolution. 16 That measure was passed in 1973 to 
prevent a repetition of what was widely regarded as the unilateral executive 
commitment of American military forces to the war in Southeast Asia. 17 No 
President has accepted its validity, although several have submitted reports to 
Congress in apparent compliance with its terms.18 At the same time, the legisla-
tive branch has scrupulously avoided invocation of the Resolution in every situa-
13. Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1869, Ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6, repealed by Act of 
Mar. 3, 1887, Ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500. The Supreme Court retroactively condemned the Act as unconstitutional 
approximately 40 years after its repeal. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926). 
14. The votes of seven Republican Senators, otherwise opponents of the President, were essential to John-
son's acquittal. These Senators voted to acquit at least in part out of concern that the Tenure of Office Act 
violated the Constitution. E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 336 ( 1988); H. TREFOUSSE, ANDREW JOHNSON 330-31 
(1989). 
15. See Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative Indepen-
dence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 722-23 (1987). 
16. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982). 
17. In fact, Congress approved presidential action in the region when it passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution 
in August 1964. H.R.J. Res. 1145, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed by Act of Jan. 12, 1971, 
Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055. Thereafter the executive branch asserted that the Resolution 
served as the functional equivalent of a congressional declaration of war. See. e.g., Office of the Legal Adviser, 
Department of State, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of VietNam, 75 YALE L.J. 1085, 
1102-06 ( 1966). 
18. See HousE COMM. ON FoREIGN AFFAIRS, 97TH CoNG., 2D SEss., THE WAR PowERS RESOLUTION 169-
254 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinafter HousE STUDY]; Carter. The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolu-
tion, 10 VA. L. REv. 101, 104-07 (1984); Koh, Why the Preside/11 (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: 
Lessons of the lran-Comra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1260 & nn.I4-15 (I 988); Comment, The War Powers 
Resolution After Fifteen Years: A Reassessment, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 141, 160-62 (1988). 
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tion in which it seemed to apply. 1° Court rulings have neither undermined this 
measure nor stimulated recent proposals to amend it. 20 
Finally, Watergate itself suggests the limits of judicial review in separation 
of powers disputes between the political branches. It is true that the Supreme 
Court decision in the Nixon tapes case led directly to President Nixon's resigna-
tion from office. That decision was not the only factor in that process, though. 
Simultaneously, the House Judiciary Committee was conducting an inquiry that 
culminated in the voting of three articles of impeachment against the President. 
While members of Congress might have preferred to await the Court's ruling, 
the impeachment process probably would have led to the same denouement even 
in the absence of the parallel judicial proceeding. 21 
The emphasis upon the limited utility cif judicial resolution of separation of 
powers disputes between the political branches is addressed primarily to elected 
officials, lawyers, and citizens. It suggests that less reliance upon litigation could 
promote more intelligent public policymaking by creating incentives for reason-
able accommodation of conflicting viewpoints. Following the course recom-
mended in this Article would not be a panacea. This approach involves the crea-
tion of necessary, not sufficient, conditions for more effective governance and 
politics. 
At the same time, the discussion has implications for courts called upon to 
resolve interbranch separation of powers disputes. Some commentators, most 
notably Dean Choper, have suggested that the judiciary refrain from deciding 
constitutional conflicts between Congress and the President. 22 This approach 
would require substantial revision of the political question doctrine23 and would 
uphold interbranch accommodations that contravened express textual provisions 
of the Constitution. A less extreme analysis would defer to arrangements de-
vised by Congress and the President provided that those arrangements were 
consistent with the constitutional text. The goal would be to discourage litiga-
tion by persuading the political branches that resort to the judicial process 
would rarely succeed. This in turn might create incentives for the legislature 
and the executive to assess the stakes of their disputes more realistically and to 
19. See HousE STUDY, supra note 18, at 224, 227, 234-36, 242-43, 252-53; Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted 
a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 1379, 1380-81 (1988). On occasion, the legislative and 
executive branches have negotiated a compromise to avoid invocation of the Resolution. For example, a 1983 joint 
resolution, rather than the procedures specified in the War Powers Resolution, authorized the deployment of U.S. 
Marines in Lebanon for up to !8 months. Multinational Force in Lebanon, Pub. L. No. 98-119, 97 Stat. 805 
(1983) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. V 1987)). See also Sofaer, The War Powers Resolution: Fifteen 
Years Later, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 317, 326 (I 989). 
20. See Ely, supra note 19, at 1383-85; Comment, supra note 18, at 171-73. 
21. See Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment 
Process, 22 UCLA L. REv. 30 ( !974). 
22. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263 ( 1980); see id. at 260-379. 
23. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 
CoLUM. L. REv. 573, 621 n.l94 (1984). Such a development seems undesirable for the reason stated in the text. 
For a contrary view, see Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 162-75 
( 1988). 
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fashion workable solutions that would promote both free and responsible 
government.24 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews the allocation of powers in 
the Constitution, surveying both the text and the historical reasons for that allo-
cation. Part II examines the jurisprudence of separation of powers, with particu-
lar reference to the legislative-executive conflicts of the past fifteen years. This 
discussion focuses less upon finding the "correct" approach in such cases than 
upon the inherent difficulties with any unitary formula. Part III considers the 
consequences of the recent separation of powers debate and explores the limita-
tions of judicial review in this field. 
I. THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTION 
The principle of separation of powers may be said to "define the very char-
acter of the American political system,"25 but giving precise content to this 
principle has not proved easy. For Justice Brandeis, the concept afforded an 
essential safeguard against tyranny: "The doctrine of the separation of powers 
was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to pre-
clude the exercise of arbitrary power."26 For Justice Jackson, it facilitated re-
sponsible governance: "While the Constitution diffuses power the better to se-
cure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed 
powers into a workable government."27 Ironically, these judicial statements 
serve as premises for legal conclusions that might seem counterintuitive to the 
casual reader.28 That fact should caution against reliance upon mechanistic for-
mulas in this field. 
24. The recommendation against reliance upon judicial resolution of separation of powers disputes between 
Congress and the President does not necessarily apply to other constitutional issues. The rationale for the recom-
mendation in this context is that the legislative and executive branches generally have ample resources with which 
to protect themselves. That is not true, for example, in individual rights cases, in which the party asserting a 
constitutional violation frequently lacks meaningful access to the political process as a means of self-defense. 
Similarly, this rationale may not apply in federalism disputes. To be sure, the Supreme Court has suggested 
that the structure of federal politics protects state interests and therefore obviates the need for judicial enforce-
ment of the tenth amendment. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 ( 1985). Nu-
merous critics have pointed out that this reasoning exaggerates the extent to which the states are protected against 
federal encroachment. See, e.g., id. at 564-67 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); 
Merritt. supra note 2, at 15-17. Even if these criticisms understate the protection that the states enjoy in national 
politics, see Hero, The U.S. Congress and American Federalism: Are 'Subnationa/' Governments Protected?, 42 
W. PoL. Q. 93, I 03 ( 1989). it remains true that the stales do not directly participate in the federal government. By 
contrast, Congress and the President are the principal actors in a broad array of federal activities. 
25. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 151 (1969). Indeed, the principle 
of separation of powers was "the characteristic that distinguished our system from all others conceived up to the 
time of our Constitution." Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 507 ( 1977) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
26. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
27. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
28. The quotation from Justice Brandeis occurs in the final paragraph of a 55-page opinion rejecting a 
separation of powers argument. The quotation from Justice Jackson comes near the beginning of a 22-page opin-
ion upholding a separation of powers challenge to a presidential emergency action taken during wartime. The two 
statements are less inconsistent than the text implies, however. Both suggest that the President lacks unfettered 
inherent authority in the performance of his duties. 
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Understanding the concept of separation of powers requires consideration 
both of the text of the Constitution and of its background. The next sections 
survey the circumstances that prompted dissatisfaction with the Articles of 
Confederation, examine the distribution of federal powers among the branches 
and review the reasons that led the framers to that distribution. ' 
A. The Central Government Under Confederation 
The Constitutional Convention culminated years of dissatisfaction with 
government under the Articles of Confederation. From the time that the Arti-
cles were ratified in 1781, the national government lacked the power to deal 
with fiscal, diplomatic, and related challenges to its sovereignty. The absence of 
coercive authority contributed significantly to the demise of that regime. In-
deed, unhappiness with the Articles existed almost from the beginning and pro-
posals for reform were advanced within months of their adoption.29 
The Confederation faced critical financial problems throughout its exis-
tence. Shortly after the ratification of the Articles, the Continental Congress 
passed an impost to raise enough money to pay its expenses. The Congress 
could not compel the states to accept this levy, and by the fall of 1782 several 
had rejected it.30 With the Revolutionary War effectively over but peace negoti-
ations languishing, the army went unpaid and became increasingly disaffected. 
Congress thereupon adopted another unsuccessful impost, although enough 
money came in to give the troops one month's pay in cash and three in certifi-
cates. That incomplete payment mollified the armed forces for the moment. 31 
The wolf remained close to the door, however. By 1786, the new nation 
faced bankruptcy. Three years after passage of the last impost, such leading 
states as New York were continuing to refuse to pay levies for purposes that 
they could not control.32 Tax revenues barely sufficed to meet current expenses, 
and debt service payments exceeding a million dollars annually loomed on the 
horizon.33 
The Confederation faced equally daunting challenges on the diplomatic 
and military fronts. Several states ignored their obligations under the Treaty of 
Paris to respect British claims against American debtors and property. Some, 
notably New York, also passed discriminatory laws against former Tories. 
Faced with the new nation's apparent inability to comply with the Treaty, Eng-
land refused to surrender its military outposts in the Northwest Territory. 34 In 
addition, the British government continued to impose restrictions upon Ameri-
can navigation. The Continental Congress sought authority to respond to those 
restrictions but divisions among the states prevented an effective, timely, and 
29. A. MCLAUGHLIN, THE CONFEDERATION ANO THE CONSTITUTION 1783-1789, at 119, 121 (Collier Books 
ed. 1962). 
30. A. Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 32-33 (1987); Elkins & McKitrick, The Founding Fa-
thers{:j Young Men of the Revolution, 76 PoL Set. Q. 181, 207 (1961). 
31. A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 50-58; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 207. 
32. A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 63-64; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 207. 
33. F. McDONALD, Novus 0RDO SECLORUM 94-95 (1985); A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 64-66. 
34. A. Cox, supra note 30, at 33; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 208-09. 
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unified response.35 Simultaneously, the new nation faced potentially hostile 
claims from Spain in Florida and along the Mississippi River, as well as from 
Britain, which was still securely ensconced in Canada. Nevertheless, the states 
frequently refused to recognize or be bound by the efforts of Congress' desig-
nated representatives to protect American commerce through diplomatic 
channels. 36 
This lack of centralized authority crippled the national government under 
the Confederation and demoralized the Continental Congress. The absence of a 
quorum frequently prevented Congress from transacting business; when a quo-
rum did exist the objections of a single state delegation often blocked significant 
changes. 37 By 1786, the new government found itself on the brink of collapse. 38 
These difficulties were not the only ones facing the Confederation.39 
Problems also proliferated at the state level. Commercial warfare had broken 
out among the states/0 and class warfare seemed imminent to mercantile and 
propertied interests in some jurisdictions.41 For many, the last straw was 
Shays's Rebellion, during which the Massachusetts authorities temporized and 
seemed barely capable of preserving order.42 In short, within five years of York-
town widespread sentiment supported reform of the Articles of Confederation to 
promote a more effective government.43 The Constitutional Convention met 
against this background. 
B. The New System of the Constitution 
While concan over governmental ineffectiveness and irresponsibility 
prompted much of the dissatisfaction with the Confederation, preventing tyr-
35. A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 60-61, 66-68. 
36. A. Cox, supra note 30. at 33; A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 70-81, 123. 
37. A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29. at 68; Ell{ins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 209. 
38. F. McDONALD, supra note 33, at 177-78; G. Wooo, supra note 25, at 464; Elkins & McKitrick, supra 
note 30, at 208. 
39. For much of this period, these problems of the central government seemed rather less important to those 
who viewed the former colonies as separate states than they did to those who viewed th,e states as parts of a new 
nation. State governments in the early 1780s appeared to be working tolerably well. A. Cox, supra note 30, at 33; 
G. Wooo, supra note 25, at 464; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 208. That perception changed later in the 
decade and helped to generate support for reform of the Articles of Confederation. See infra text accompanying 
notes 40-43. 
That most Americans at this time viewed themselves as citizens of sovereign states rather than of a larger 
country should not be surprising. The decision of Robert E. Lee and many Southern-born army officers to fight for 
their states rather than for the Union during the Civil War disappointed but did not astonish federal officials. J. 
McPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 280-81 {1988). The outcome of that war effected a fundamental transfor-
mation of public consciousness. From that time, Americans much more readily conceived of themselves as citizens 
of the nation than of sovereign states. !d. at 859. 
40. Concern over interstate economic conflicts led to the abortive Annapolis Convention of 1786. A. Cox, 
supra note 30, at 34; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, at 209. 
41. A. Cox, supra note 30, at 33; G. Wooo, supra note 25, at 465-66; Elkins & McKitrick, supra note 30, 
at 208. 
42. A. Cox, supra note 30, at 33; A. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 29, at 116-17. 
43. G. Wooo, supra note 25, at 360-63, 465-67; Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between 
the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Com•ention, 30 AM. HIST. REv. 511, 513 
(1925). 
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anny and protecting liberty remained preeminent values in the new nation.44 As 
the 1780s wore on, Americans increasingly viewed the idea of separation of 
powers as "the most important attribute of the kinds of governments they had 
fought for." 45 Thus, the framers who met in Philadelphia during the summer of 
1787 faced an apparent choice between efficiency and freedom as they struggled 
to give content to this idea.46 
The Constitutional Convention evaded this dilemma, if one may so charac-
terize the situation, by means of a novel attempt to accommodate both goals. 
The delegates rejected the "pure doctrine" of separation of powers, under which 
each branch is assigned a unique function and may not intrude upon the func-
tion of any other branch,47 in favor of a more ambiguous system of checks and 
balances, under which each branch was given a limited control over the exercise 
of the functions of the other branches.48 
The framers established a government of separated powers assigned respec-
tively to legislative, executive, and judicial branches.49 The legislature was di-
vided into two chambers-a House of Representatives elected by the people and 
apportioned more or less according to population50 and a Senate chosen indi-
rectly under a formula guaranteeing each state equal representation.51 The ex-
ecutive branch would have one person, the indirectly elected President, at the 
helm. 52 The judiciary would not be elected at all and would have tenure and 
salary guarantees to insulate it from most external pressure. 53 
44. Opponents of the Convention's handiwork "accepted the broad outlines of the picture painted by the 
friends of the Constitution." H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 26 (1981). They differed in 
the extent to which they viewed the problems under Confederation as stemming from the weakness of the central 
government and in their assessment of the desirability and likely success of the new charter. /d. at 28. 
45. G. WOOD, supra note 25, at 453. See M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
I 53-54 ( 1967); G. Wooo, supra note 25, at 449-53. If the practices of early state governments can serve as a 
guide, Americans in the first years after 1776 had a rudimentary concept of separation of powers principles. These 
charters often were more concerned with avoiding repetition of the manipulation of the courts and legislatures by 
colonial governors than with providing for meaningful division of governmental authority. M. VILE, supra, at 153-
57. 
The divergence between theory and practice resulted more from the difficulties of governing under extraordi-
nary conditions than from conscious repudiation of principle, however. /d. at 132-47. Even opponents of the Con-
stitution accepted the basic premise of separation of powers; the Anti- Federalists generally did not defend the lack 
of "any differentiation of functions or internal checks" under the Confederation. H. STORING, supra note 44, at 
55. 
46. In fact, as many as five different theoretical justifications for the concept of separation of powers existed 
when the Constitutional Convention assembled. W. GwYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 127-
28 (1965). In addition to the rationales of efficiency, see id. at 31-35; Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation 
of Powers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 715, 718-22 (1984); and liberty, see W. GWYN, supra, at 18-23, 
40-43; M. VILE, supra note 45, at 61-63; others included the rule of law, see W. GWYN, supra, at 52-58, 7!-76, 
I 04-13; official accountability, see id. at 60-64, 85-87; and balancing powers within the government, see id. at 55-
56, 85-87. 
47. M. VILE, supra note 45, at 13-18. 
48. /d. at 18. For discussion of the English antecedents of balanced government, see id. at 53-75. 
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (legislative); art. II, § I, cl. 1 (executive); art. III, § 1 (judicial). 
50. !d. art. I, § 2, cl. 1, 3. 
51. /d. § 3, cl. 1. As a practical matter, the states are guaranteed equal representation in the Senate in 
perpetuity because no state may have its delegation in that chamber reduced without its consent. !d. art. V. 
52. /d. art. II, § I, cl. 1-3. 
53. /d. art. III, § 1. The Supreme Court was the only judicial institution created by the Constitution. Con-
gress was given discretion to create inferior courts, discretion which it exercised in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 
1990] SEPARATION OF POWERS 183 
This new scheme thus directly addressed two of the major problems of the 
Confederation. First, the Constitution gave the federal government explicit au-
thority to tax54 and to regulate interstate and foreign commerce.55 Second, the 
new charter created a unitary executive. 56 These features suggest that consider-
ations of efficiency played an important part in the drafting process. At the 
same time, the federal government was given only enumerated powers. 57 These 
restrictions upon central authority suggest an effort to reduce the prospect of 
tyranny. Thus, the Constitution created a structure that seemed to address both 
of the principal concerns arising from the experience under the Articles of 
Confederation. 
Consistent with their rejection of the pure separation theory, the drafters of 
the new charter blended the responsibilities of the branches. Accordingly, the 
Constitution also provided for a complex set of checks and balances to structure 
interbranch relationships. A few familiar examples illustrate those interactions. 
Congress received the power to legislate, but the President was given a qualified 
veto over bills approved by both the House and the Senate, which could in turn 
override an executive disapproval by a supermajority vote in each chamber. 58 
Similarly, the President was designated as Commander in Chief of the armed 
forces, 59 but only Congress could declare war. 60 The President gained the power 
to make treaties, but only with the advice and consent of a supermajority of the 
Senate.61 The President also would appoint officers of the United States, includ-
ing judges, but the Senate once again had to give its advice and consent.62 In 
addition, Congress could limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 63 
Two features of the constitutional scheme are worthy of comment. First, 
the rejection of the pure separation theory allowed opponents of the new charter 
20, §§ 2-4, I Stat. 73, 73-75. Members of both the Supreme Court and the lower courts were to enjoy identical 
tenure and salary protection. U.S. CaNST. art. Ill, § I. 
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I. This power was limited by the uniformity clause in the same provision that 
gave the federal government the authority to levy tHes. See also id. § 9, cl. 4 (restricting direct taxation). 
55. /d. § 8, cl. 3. 
56. See E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1957, at 3-30 (1957); Strauss, supra note 
23, at 599-602. 
57. This feature is most noticeable in the provisions dealing with the lawmaking function. Those provisions 
begin by stating that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
States .... " U.S. CoNST. art. I, § I. Later, Congress is explicitly granted certain authority, see id. § 8, and 
forbidden to undertake other actions, id. § 9. 
58. /d. § 7, cl. 2. 
59. /d. art. II, § 2, cl. I. 
60. /d. art. I, § 8, cl. II. 
61. /d. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
62. Jd. 
63. The precise contours of the congressional powers to establish exceptions to the jurisdiction of article Ill 
tribunals and to abolish the lower federal courts that have been created are matters of some scholarly controversy. 
See. e.g., Eisenberg, Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 
( 1974); Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongo-
ing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953); Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate 
Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 
VILL. L. REv. 900 (1982); Sager, The Supreme Court, /980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on 
Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981). Resolution 
of these controversies is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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to argue that the excessive blending of the branches threatened liberty b, 
ing inordinate power to the federal government.64 More modern comm] grant-
who are less troubled about the activist state claim that the Constitution entators 
less a system of "separated powers" than "a government of separated ~rea.ted 
· h · "65 Jnst1tu tJOns s anng powers. -
This observation, whether made in the eighteenth century or the tw . 
· k I h · d'ff · d enl!eth mtsta en y assumes t at power ts an un 1 erenttate concept that can be 1 • 
d I d I I 
. - . a lo-
cate more or ess ran om y to any governmenta mstttutJOn. A more ac 
f h . . 1 II . f curate assessment o t e constttutJOna a ocatwn o powers recognizes that go 
ments perform different functions and that those functions are appropriver~~ pe.rfo~med by instit~tions having di~erent cha~acte~istics. Each branch, u~t~e~ 
thts vtew, has supenor but not exclustve authonty wtth regard to its function 66 
For example, the making of policy that reflects popular will is most appro s .. _ 
ately undertaken by the legislature, a comparatively large institution that re pn 
sents a broad array of interests, holds public sessions, and follows proced~~e: 
that foster deliberation. Yet because no legislator, however chosen, has a n~~ 
tiona! constituency, the qualified presidential veto can block improper, unwise 
or unduly parochial proposals.67 • 
Second, the blending of powers in the Constitution greatly enhanced the 
possibilities of interbranch conflict, especially between Congress and the Presi-
dent. This feature was not accidentaL The framers recognized and accepted 
human frailty, most notably in Madison's famous comment that "[i]f men were 
angels, no government would be necessary. " 68 They therefore established a sys-
tem designed to prevent overreaching by one branch at the expense of another 
64. See H. STORING, supru note 44, at 15-21. 28. Madison responded directly to this criticism by arguing 
that separation of powers, properly understood, "did not mean that these departments ought to have nn pani,lf 
agency in, or no colllrol over the acts of each other." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302 (J. Madison) (C. Rossi:<r 
ed. 1961 ). Rather, he contended, tyranny impended only "where the whole power of one department is cxcret"d 
by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department." !d. at 302-03. 
A related objection to the Constitution focused upon the absence of a bill of rights. See THE A\IER"''' 
CONSTITUTION: fOR AND AGAINST 17-18, 40-43 (J. Pole ed. 1987). Hamilton rebutted this criticism in three"''"' 
He began by showing that the charter explicitly protected some individual rights. THE FEDERALIST No. 84. at~ l: 
(A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961 ); see The Individual Liberties Within the Body of the Constitution ·I 
Symposium, 37 CASE W. REs. L REv. 589-861 ( 1987). Next, he maintained that a bill of rights would be "unnec· 
essary" and perhaps "dangerous" because it would serve as a pretext for the government to claim mure JX'""' 
than had been granted. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra, at 513. Finally, he contended thai "the Coostitutiun 1' 
itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights." Jd. at 515 (emphasis omiuedl: "''' 
Rossum, The Federalist's Understanding of the Constitution as a Bill of Rights; in SAVING THE REvULL nc;., 
219, 221-28 (C. Kesler ed. 1987). 
65. R. NEUSTADT. PRESIDENTIAL POWER 26 (rev. ed. 1980) (emphasis and footnote omitted). The first cdl· 
tion of this classic work in political science appeared in 1960, when the dominant approaches in thai discipilnc 
discounted the significance of legal and constitutional factors in politics. Some scholars viewed these facwrs ·'' 
irrelevant, while others rejected them as undesirable obstacles to effective national leadership. See generally Hes· 
sette & Tulis, The Constitution. Politics. and the Presidency, in THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CoNSTITUTiO~AL O<-
DER 3, 4-6 (J. Bessette & J. Tulis eds. 1981 ). 
66. See H. STORING, supra note 44, at 60; J. TULIS, THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 41 ( !98?). 
67. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947-48 (1983); R SPITZER- THE 
PRESIDENTIAL VETO 16, 17 ( 1988 ); J T~US, supra note 66, at 42-43. . . -oauthur> 
68. THE fEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961 ), One of Madtson s 'f . _ m 
added that government was instituted "[b]ecause the passions of men will not conform to the dictates 0 ''""' 
and justice without constraint." THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 110 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter cd. 19611· 
,., 
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and of liberty.69 Instead of relying upon rigid functional boundaries,70 the Con-
stitution sought to provide officials of each branch with "the necessary constitu-
tional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. " 71 To 
prevent overreaching, therefore, "[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambi-
tion. "72 These ground rules would structure interbranch conflict, and would do 
so in ways that increased the likelihood of beneficial outcomes. 73 
The President's qualified veto power, which already has been mentioned, 
illustrates this concept. Wary of pre-Revolution abuses of the royal prerogative 
by the British crown, Americans hesitated to allow the President any power to 
disapprove legislation.74 Nevertheless, many supported some such right as a 
means of protecting the executive from legislative encroachment.75 Because the 
President might refrain from exercising an absolute veto for fear of being la-
beled a despot,76 the framers provided for a qualified presidential negative that 
would give Congress an opportunity to reconsider and give effect to a vetoed 
proposal if it attracted an unusually large measure of support. This seemingly 
less extreme authority, they reasoned, was simultaneously more likely to be used 
and less likely to offend, and therefore would serve as a potent weapon in the 
new government.77 
Strikingly absent from these discussions of the benefits of interbranch polit-
ical conflict as a mechanism for promoting effective, nontyrannical government 
is any mention of the judiciary as umpire of constitutional disputes between 
Congress and the President.'8 We shall consider whether this omission has sig-
nificance in Part III. For now, suffice it to say that these matters have not been 
exceptions to de Tocqueville's observation quoted in the first paragraph of this 
69. D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 137-38 ( 1984); M. WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE 
FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-98 (1987). 
70. The framers rejected the definitional approach because they viewed it as unworkable. As Madison 
explained: 
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate 
and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or 
even the privileges and powers of the different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of 
practice which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in 
political science. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also D. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 127; 
M. WHITE, supra note 69, at 103. 
71. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 68, at 321-22. 
. 72. ld. at 322. It bears emphasis that "ambition" in this context does not imply that officials necessarily act 
Wtth corrupt purposes when they seek excessive powers. M. WHITE, supra note 69, at 98. 
73. H. STORING, supra note 44, at 61; J. Tuus, supra note 66, at 43-45. 
74. l. FISHER. CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 141 (1985); R. 
SPITZER, supra note 67, at 8-12, 21-22 . 
. 75. Without some veto power, absolute or qualified, the President "might gradually be stripped of his au-
thontJes by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the legislative 
~nd executive powers might speedily come to be blended in the same hands." THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442 (A. 
amJiton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Even some opponents of the Constitution accepted this reasoning. R. SPITZER, 
supra note 67, at 21; H. STORING, supra note 44, at 61. 
th 76·. It also was recognized that an absolute veto might be used too readily in extraordinary circumstances, 
ere by Increasing the risk of executive aggrandizement or presidential tyranny. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, 
supra note 68, at 323; R. SPITZER, supra note 67, at 12. 
17_20
_77. THE fEDERALIST No. 73, at 444-46 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); R. SPITZER, supra note 67, at 
78. D. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 140. 
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Article. The following discussion examines the recent work of the Supreme, 
Court in this field. 
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS JURISPRUDENCE IN THE 1980s 
The past decade has witnessed numerous constitutional challenges to insti-
tutions exercising federal authority. These challenges have afforded the Su-
preme Court the opportunity to clarify the appropriate division of functions 
among the branches. The results of this enterprise have produced some illumi-
nation and considerable confusion. Sometimes the Court has applied a formal 
approach emphasizing the separateness of the branches, while other times it has 
taken a more pragmatic perspective focusing upon their interdependence. Al-
though the choice of methodology has determined the outcome of every case, 
the opinions consistently have failed to articulate how or why the Court has 
selected its analytical approach. 
This Part focuses upon cases involving the respective powers of Congress 
and the President.79 It begins with a brief look at three rulings spawned by 
aspects of the Nixon presidency that have come to be subsumed under the label 
of Watergate, then proceeds chronologically through the 1980s to consider the 
legislative veto, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, the Ethics in Government 
Act, and two cases from the 1988 Term presenting issues under the delegation 
doctrine. The discussion emphasizes both the contrasting analytical approaches 
used in these cases and the empirical and logical difficulties inherent in these 
approaches. 
A. The Watergate-Related Cases 
The June 17, 1972, burglary of the Democratic National Committee's 
headquarters in the Watergate office complex set in motion a series of investiga-
tions of White House involvement in unlawful and unethical activities. Eventu-
ally a special prosecutor was appointed to direct the criminal investigation. The 
special prosecutor obtained a subpoena directing President Nixon to produce 
various tape recordings, papers, and other materials relating to a pending crimi-
79. These decisions represent only the tip of the iceberg. Numerous lower court cases during this period also 
have challenged the constitutionality of federal activities. E.g., SEC v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677. 
681-82 (lOth Cir. 1988), cerr. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1172 (!989); Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 8!4 F.2d 731 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987); Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 881-87 (3d Cir.), on reh'g, 809 
F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cerr. dismissed, 109 S. Ct. 297 (1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce, 
697 F.2d 303, 305-06 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Friedlander v. United :;;tates Postal Serv., 658 F. Supp. 95, 
99-102 (D. D.C. 1987). A rough statistical survey recently found a marked increase in the number of federal cases 
since 1960 in which the court discussed the con.cept of separation of powers, an increase that persisted even with 
modest controls for growth in the size and output of the judiciary. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: 
Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 401,402-04 (1989). See also supra notes 2 & 
24 (discussing recent Supreme Court rulings on other aspects of governmental structure). 
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nal trial.80 A unanimous Court upheld the validity of the subpoena against a 
claim of executive privilege in United States v. Nixon. 81 
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected a rigid view of separation of 
powers. Without disputing the President's contention that the executive branch 
has exclusive authority over prosecution,82 the opinion emphasized the need for 
effective governance. 83 Thus, there was no "absolute, unqualified Presidential 
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances."84 Rather, 
the constitutional inquiry should focus upon the extent to which enforcing the 
subpoena for specific presidential materials that were "demonstrably relevant" 
to a particular criminal trial85 would interfere with the performance of essential 
executive functions such as protecting the national security. Because President 
Nixon had failed to show such interference in this case, his claim of privilege 
failed. 86 
Within two weeks, the White House released transcripts of some of the 
tape recordings sought by the special prosecutor. Those tapes confirmed that 
soon after the Watergate break-in, the President had had detailed discussions 
with his aides about concealing the administration's involvement. Three days 
later, Nixon resigned. 87 His departure set off a dispute over the ownership and 
control of his official papers, a dispute that returned to the Supreme Court three 
80. Leon Jaworski, the special prosecutor who sought those materials, was in fact the second person to hold 
that position. The first, Archibald Cox, had been discharged and his office abolished several months earlier over 
his efforts to obtain nine specific recordings of presidential conversations. Attorney General Richardson resigned 
and Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus was fired after refusing orders to dismiss Cox. The intense public 
reaction to these events led to the reestablishment of the special prosecutor's office and the appointment of Jawor-
ski. For a contemporaneous account of these events, see E. DREW, WASHINGTON JoURNAL 4-5, 17, 21.46-67, 75. 
76-77, 85,91 {1975). 
81. 418 U.S. 683 { 1974) [hereinafter Nixon 1]. The case arose from the President's unsuccessful motion to 
have the district court quash the subpoena. The Supreme Court heard the case under a rare procedure that 
bypassed proceedings in the court of appeals. Jd. at 689-90. See generally Lindgren & Marshall, The Supreme 
Court·s Extraordinary Power to Grant Certiorari Before Judgment in the Court of Appeals, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 
259. 
82. Nixon 1, 418 U.S. at 693. This would be the central issue in the litigation over the independent counsel 
provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. See infra Part II.D. 
83. The opinion observed that 
the Framers of the Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were 
not intended to operate with absolute independence .... To read the Art. II powers of the President as 
providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no 
more than a generalized claim of the public interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic 
discussions would upset the constitutional balance of "a workable government" . 
Nixon/, 418 U.S. at 707. 
84. Jd. at 706. 
85. !d. at 712. 
86. /d. at 707-13. 
Before addressing the merits, the Court rejected the argument that the controversy was a nonjusticiable 
intrabranch dispute. The regulations establishing the special prosecutor's office assured the special prosecutor of 
substantial independence in the performance of his duties. Because they also had the force of law so long as they 
remained in force, the case did not present a simple squabble between superior and subordinate. !d. at 694-97. 
The Court did not allude to any constitutional infirmity in the provision that the special prosecutor could be 
removed only for "extraordinary improprieties" and then only with the consensus approval of the party leaders 
and top-ranking members of the relevant committees in both houses of Congress. See id. at 694-95 n.8. But cf 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,726 {1986) {holding that Congress may not participate in the removal of officials 
exercising executive power, except if the removal occurs through the process of impeachment expressly provided in 
the Constitution); see infra Part II.C. 
87. See E. DREW, s11pra note 80, at 389-416. 
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years afterward in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services. 88 This decis· 
upheld the constitutionality of the provisions of the Presidential Recordings ;o~ 
Materials Preservation Act89 directing the head of the General Services Adm; ~ 
istration to take control of Mr. Nixon's official papers and records and to pr~­
serve them from destruction.90 
In rejecting Mr. Nixon's claim that the Act was facially invalid because it 
impermissibly encroached upon the chief executive's authority, the Court agai 
abjured a rigid view of separation of powers in favor of a perspective emphasiz~ 
ing checks and balances. Relying upon the ruling in the Watergate tapes case 
the majority reasoned that "the proper inquiry focuses on the extent to which 
[the Act] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally 
assigned functions. "91 In the event that a statute did interfere with the perform-
ance of executive functions, the measure still might pass muster if "that impact 
[were] justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitu-
tional authority of Congress. " 92 Finding no undue disruption of the executive 
(based in part upon the assignment of control over the presidential materials to 
an executive branch agency), the Court held the Act constitutional on its face.9a 
The Court's adoption of a "pragmatic, flexible approach " 94 in these cases 
left undefined the precise nature of the unjustified disruption of executive func-
tions that would violate the Constitution. 05 Perhaps the unique historical cir-
cumstances of the demise of the Nixon presidency made this problem less ur-
gent at the time. 96 As we shall see, however, the 1980s demonstrated the 
difficulty of giving content-in particular, judicially manageable content-to 
the checks-and-balances perspective. 
Meanwhile, the Court was addressing the principal statutory reform that 
came out of the problems uncovered by the various Watergate investigations. 
Among other changes, the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 
197497 created a six-member Federal Election Commission to administer and 
88. 433 U.S. 425 (I 977) (hereinafter Nixon If]. 
89. Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat. 1695 (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 2107 note (1982)). 
90. The Act also directed the Administrator to promulgate appropriate regulations for public access to these 
materials, a task that had not been completed when the litigation took place. Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 430. This 
statute was passed to supersede an agreement with the Administrator that recognized the former President's sole 
ownership of these materials, gave him effective control over access to them, required the destruction of tape 
recordings of White House conversations within ten years, and allowed him to remove "any or all" of the other 
materials three years after the agreement was made. ld. at 431-32. 
91. ld. at 443. 
92. !d. 
93. !d. at 443-45. Two Justices, in separate opinions, also placed some weight upon President Ford's having 
signed the Act into law and President Carter's submission through the Solicitor General that the Act benefited 
rather than harmed the executive branch in the performance of its duties. ld. at 491 (Blackmun, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 498, 501-02 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
94. Nixon ll, 433 U.S. at 442. 
95. See id. at 511-12 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 548 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
96. See Nixon ll, 433 U.S. at 472 (upholding legislation specifically addressing Mr. Nixon's official records 
because he constituted "a legitimate class of one"); id. at 486 (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that Mr. Nixon 
"resigned his office under unique circumstances"); id. at 493-94 (Powell, J ., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment) (emphasizing the "extraordinary events that led to (Mr. Nixon's] resignation and pardon"). 
97. Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as further amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26 & 
47 u.s.c. (1982)). 
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enforce the new political ground rules. Two commissioners were to be appointed 
by the President and two each by the President pro tempore of the Senate and 
the Speaker of the House; all six were to be confirmed by majority vote of both 
congressional chambers. 98 
The Court in Buckley v. Valeo09 held that the procedure for selecting 
members of the FEC violated the appointments clause, which requires that "of-
ficers of the United States" be nominated by the President and confirmed by 
the Senate but also permits "inferior officers" to be chosen unilaterally by the 
President, the courts, or the heads of governmental departments. 100 The Court 
reasoned that the powers of the Commission involved its members in "exercising 
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."101 This in turn 
made the commissioners "officers of the United States" who must be chosen in 
conformity with the appointments clause.102 Further, the omission of Congress 
from the list of those allowed to appoint inferior officers disqualified the leader-
ship of the legislative branch from selecting members of the Commission.103 
Of particular importance, the Court explicitly rejected a rigid demarcation 
of the three branches. Its substantive discussion not only emphasized that "the 
Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of each of [the] three 
essential branches of Government,"104 but also recognized both the value of dis-
persing power to safeguard liberty and the need for sufficient interaction of the 
branches to promote effective government,l 05 Finally, although the opinion em-
98. The Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House also served as nonvoting members of the 
Commission. !d. § 3 I O(a)( I). 
99. 424 U.S. I (I 976) (per curiam). 
100. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2: 
!The President] ... shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls. Judges of the supreme Court, and all other 
Officers of the United States, whose Appointments arc not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall 
be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as 
they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
101. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 126. 
102. /d. at 138-41. 
103. ld. at 126-27. A more parsimonious basis for this result would have emphasized that nothing in the 
appointments clause authorizes the House to vote to approve the selection of either officers of the United States or 
inferior officers. Because all parties agreed that members of the FEC fell into one or the other of these categories, 
see id. at 126 & n.J62, the Court technically did not have to determine whether the Commissioners were "of-
ficers" or "inferior officers." 
The opinion also failed adequately to address the claim that the disputed role of Congress in selecting mem-
bers of the Commission was justified by concerns that a body appointed solely by the President might be subject to 
Whtte House manipulation during the chief executive's reelection campaign. The Court recognized the legitimacy 
of those fears but dismissed them as "not by themselves warrant[ing] a distortion of the Framers' work." /d. at 
~34 · This response was incomplete at best. A fuller answer would have emphasized the purposes underlying "the 
. ramers' work." The appointments clause itself addressed the point at tssue by giving the Senate the power, 
'~deed the duty, to scrutinize nominees proffered by the President and to refuse to confirm any who Jack the 
~ aractc: to resist manipulation of their agency. This senatorial prerogative represents one of those necessary 
onstttuuonaJ means and personal motives by which the framers expected ambition to counteract ambition. See 
supra text accompanying notes 71-72. 
104
· Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121. 
1 05
· The Court exolained· 
:~e men who met i~ Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were practical statesmen, experienced in politics, 
h 
0 Vtewed the principle of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they likewise saw 
l at a her t' r b. me tc sea tng off of the three branches of Government from one another would preclude the 
esta ltshment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively. 
'•J' I 
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phasized that Congress (and, by necessary implication, congressional appoin-
tees) may not control the enforcement of the law, it did not assert that this was 
a purely executive function over which the President must have unfettered 
control. 106 
In short, these cases reflected a largely pragmatic approach to conflicts be-
tween Congress and the President over the allocation of governmental powers. 
When it found specific constitutional text bearing upon the matter, the Court 
attempted to give effect to that language. When it did not, the Court sought to 
strike a reasonable balance of competing interests. In none of these cases did 
the Court seek permanently to resolve all aspects of the interbranch conflict 
before it. At times during the 1980s, the Justices have been more ambitious. 
The next sections consider these more recent cases. 
B. The Legislative Veto 
Beginning with the Reorganization Act of 1932/07 Congress included pro-
visions in numerous statutes allowing either or both houses, or in some instances 
a committee, to disapprove executive or administrative actions.108 Although the 
so-called legislative veto originated as a political accommodation to facilitate 
structural reform in the executive branch, the device eventually spread into nu-
merous substantive areas of both domestic and foreign policy. 109 Presidents con-
sistently opposed these provisions as intrusions upon executive power but often 
accepted them as the price for obtaining broad delegations to undertake initia-
tives for which legal authority was otherwise lackingY0 
/d. 
106. For example, at the outset of its substantive discussion, the Court emphasized the "three essential 
branches of Government." /d. Later, however, it characterized the departments whose heads may be granted the 
power to appoint inferior officers as "[being] in the Executive Branch or at least havfing} some connection with 
that branch." !d. at 127 (emphasis added). The italicized phrase implicitly recognized the existence of so-called 
independent agencies which are not "in" any of the three branches. 
In addition, the opinion suggested that the Commission's rulemaking functions cannot be exercised by a 
congressionally controlled agency. /d. at 140. This is curious because rulemaking traditionally has been viewed as 
"the result of a delegation of legislative power." Strauss, supra note 23, at 618. For present purposes, this point 
simply underscores the Buckley Court's unwillingness to follow a rigid approach to separation of powers questions. 
The implied hostility to congressional control over administrative rulemaking ultimately was manifested in deci-
sions invalidating the legislative veto. See infra Part II.B. In this case, however, the Court avoided resolution of 
the constitutionality of a one-house veto of FEC regulations. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 140 n.l76. 
107. Ch. 314, § 407, 47 Stat. 382, 414-15. 
108. Scholars differ on the precise number of these provisions, although the figure is substantial. One writer 
reports that 318 legislative veto provisions were included in 210 statutes between 1932 and 1982. G. BRYNER. 
BUREAUCRATIC DisCRETION 76 (1987). Two others cite studies showing that 295 such provisions appeared in 196 
statutes between 1932 and 1975 and that 78 more were adopted between 1979 and 1982. W. EsKRIDGE, JR. & P. 
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 496 (1988) (citing C. NORTON, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW. 
DEFERRAL AND DISRUPTION OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS: A SUMMARY AND INVENTORY OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
8-12 (1976), and Cooper, The Legislative Veto in the 1980s, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 364, 367 (L. Dodd & 
B. Oppenheimer 3d ed. 1985)). Resolving the statistical discrepancy would not affect the analysis of this Article. 
109. See generally CONGRESSIONAL REs. SERV. FOR THE SuoCOMM. ON RuLES OF THE HousE OF THE HousE 
COMM. ON RULES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO (Comm. Print 1980). 
110. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968-74 (1983) (White, J., dissent-
ing); L. FISHER, supra note 74, at 164-70; Fisher, Congress and the President in the Administrative Process: The 
Uneasy Alliance, in THE ILLUSION OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 21, 26-28 (H. Hecla & L. Salamon eds. 1981 ); 
Karl, Executive Reorganization and Presidential Power, 1977 SUP. CT. REv. I, 3-7; Nathanson, Separation of 
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The constitutional controversy came to a head in the somewhat anomalous 
setting of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha.111 The setting 
was anomalous because that case did not involve the rulemaking or reorganiza-
tion powers over which the primary debates on the legislative veto had raged. 
Instead, it concerned the deportation of Jagdish Chadha, an East Asian born in 
Kenya who had overstayed his student visa.112 The Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service determined that Chadha qualified for suspension of deportation 
because he would suffer "extreme hardship" if he were required to leave this 
country.113 Pursuant to the one-house veto provision of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 114 the House of Representatives passed a resolution disapprov-
ing the suspension of Chadha's deportation. The resolution was neither printed 
nor available to Representatives; it passed by voice vote without debate at virtu-
ally the last possible moment. 115 
The Supreme Court, in striking contrast with its approach in the Water-
gate-related cases, wrote a sweeping opinion invalidating not only the statutory 
provision under which the House had disapproved the INS's decision favoring 
Chadha, but also striking down every legislative veto of whatever kind. Under-
lying its ruling were an explicit rejection of the importance of governmental 
efficiency and an assumption that each branch has uniquely defined 
responsibilities. 
The Court began its substantive analysis by stating that "the fact that a 
given ... procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful ... will not save it if it 
is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary 
objectives ... of democratic government .... " 116 Indeed, the preservation of 
democratic government required constant vigilance to resist "[t]he hydraulic 
pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer lim-
its of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives."117 To that end, each 
branch ought to be seen as "presumptively exercising the power the Constitu-
tion has delegated to it"118 and must act in strict compliance with the constitu-
tional requirements applicable to that branch. Because the action in question in 
Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation. the Legislative Veto. and the ''Independent'' Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. 
REV. 1064, 1088-89 & n.74 (1981). 
II I. 462 U.S. 919 ( 1983). 
112. Ironically, Chadha had come to the United States to study as a result of conversations two decades 
earlier with several Peace Corps volunteers. One of those volunteers was Michael Davidson, who as legal counsel 
to the Senate would argue the case against Chadha. B. CRAIG, CHADHA 4-5 {1988). 
113. Chadha's difficulties arose from ethnic tensions between blacks and Asians in his native Kenya. Al-
though he held a British passport, the United Kingdom earlier had restricted nonwhite immigration severely. /d. 
at 5-7. 
114. 8 U.S.C. § l254(c)(2) {1982). 
115. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 926-27. The Act required the INS, whenever it suspended a deportation, 
promptly to file a report summarizing the facts of the case and the reason for the suspension. Either house of 
Congress could pass a resolution disapproving that action during the same or the immediately following legislative 
session. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(I)-(2) (1982). The INS filed the required report on Chadha's case in August 1974. B. 
CRAIG, supra note 112, at 21. The House failed to act on it until three days before the end of its 197 5 session, the 
end of the period within which the suspension order could have been disapproved. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 964 n.6 
(Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
116. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. 
117. /d. at 951. 
liS. Id. 
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Chadha was taken by Congress, it was legislative in nature and therefore had to 
follow the "[e]xplicit and unambiguous provisions of the Constitution" gov-
erning legislation: passage by both houses with presentation to the President for 
approval or veto. 119 
This reasoning is troublesome for several reasons. First, it conflates the na-
ture of the action with the identity of the actor. Under this approach, all con-
gressional actions that "ha [ve] the purpose and effect of altering the legal 
rights, duties, and relations of persons ... outside the Legislative Branch"12o 
are legislative and must be taken in strict conformity with the bicameralism and 
presentation requirements. This implies, however, that the longstanding practice 
of rulemaking by administrative agencies, which also has the purpose and effect 
of altering the legal rights of persons outside the legislature, is unconstitutional 
for failure to satisfy those requirements. 121 
Further, the Court simply asserted that, before the House passed its resolu-
tion, Chadha had a legal right to remain in this country.122 In fact, the statute 
could plausibly have been read as giving him that right only if: (1) the INS 
suspended his deportation order and (2) neither congressional chamber passed a 
resolution of disapproval within the specified limitations period.123 The opinion 
failed to explain why Chadha's legal rights were not defined by the provisions of 
the Act that created them.124 
The Court might have suggested that this interpretation came distressingly 
close to the "bitter with the sweet" theory that had aroused so much contro-
versy in the procedural due process field/ 25 but that theory would not be for-
mally interred until two years later.126 Nevertheless, that insight might have led 
119. /d. at 945; see id. at 946-51. 
120. /d. at 952. 
121. See Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative 
Veto Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J. 789, 795. The Court attempted to remove the cloud that its reasoning seemed to 
cast over the legitimacy of much commonplace activity in the administrative state by proclaiming agency 
ru1emaking to be "'quasi-legislative' in character." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.l6 (quoting Humphrey's Ex'r v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 628 (1935)); cf FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) ("The mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all recognized classifica-
tions have broken down, and 'quasi' is a smooth cover which we draw over our confusion as we might use a 
counterpane to cover a disordered bed."). 
122. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952. 
123. Justice White made precisely this point in dissent. /d. at 993-94 (White, J., dissenting). See also Elliott, 
INS v. Chadha: The Administrative Constiturion, the Constiltltion, and the Legislative Veto, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 
125, 134-37; Strauss, supra note 121, at 796. 
124. Yet another difficulty with the Court's analysis arises from its presumption that any congressional ac-
tion altering the legal rights of persons outside the legislative branch must comply with the bicameralism and 
presentation requirements. In exercising its oversight and investigatory responsibilities, Congress may compel the 
appearance of nonlegislators before its committees and attach legal consequences for their failure to do so. For 
example, the controversy that culminated in Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), began with a dispute over 
the allegedly improper withholding of executive-branch records from a congressional committee. /d. at 2605-06; 
see infra Part II.D. Yet the Court did not suggest that routine committee oversight and investigations require 
bicameral approval and presentation to the President. Elliott, supra note 123, at 133-34; Strauss, supra note 121, 
at 795-96. For an explanation of this exception to these requirements, see Krent, Separating the Strands in Sepa-
ration of Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REv. 1253, 1276 & n.99 (1988). 
125. This theory posited that the government could, without violating constitutional guarantees of due pro-
cess, confer a substantive liberty or property interest in a statute that provided limited or informal procedures for 
vindicating that interest. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152-54 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
126. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
< • ~ t-l-
I 
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the Court to focus Jess upon the identity of the actor than upon the character of 
the action in question. This was, in fact, the approach taken by Justice Powell 
in a concurring opinion. He emphasized that, instead of prescribing a general 
rule of future effect applicable to a more or less general class, Congress had 
determined for itself that a specific individual failed to satisfy particular statu-
tory standards.127 Such a decision involved the performance of a typically judi-
cial function and was made in this instance with none of the procedural protec-
tions and other checks against arbitrary action that inhere in adjudication. The 
absence of those protections rendered this specific legislative veto provision un-
constitutional but would not necessarily invalidate others. 128 
This approach has the virtue of recognizing the different contexts in which 
legislative vetoes can arise. Nevertheless, it is not entirely free from difficulty. 
One cannot confidently assert that Congress lacks constitutional authority to 
pass on decisions to suspend deportation because, before the procedure at issue 
in Chadha was adopted, the legislature itself resolved such cases through pri-
vate bills.129 Moreover, the Constitution gives Congress express authority over 
immigration,130 and one of Madison's statements in the Constitutional Conven-
tion strongly implies his belief that the legislature had power over individual 
naturalization cases. 131 Thus, focusing more narrowly upon the nature of the 
action at issue in Chadha would not necessarily have required invalidating the 
legislative veto provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 132 
The difficulties of a contextual perspective do not end here. As remarked 
earlier, the pre-Chadha debate had focused primarily upon the use of the legis-
lative veto in connection with rulemaking and reorganization. Some commenta-
tors have suggested contrasting analyses of the veto in these varying settings. 
They believe that legislative vetoes can be justified in reorganization and similar 
statutes because government reorganization, salary adjustment, and impound-
ment decisions-some typical examples of so-called nonregulatory vetoes-are 
essentially matters of Washington housekeeping appropriate for rough and 
ready political accommodation between the White House and Capitol Hill.133 
Legislative vetoes of administrative rules-so-called regulatory vetoes-are said 
to divert congressional attention from fundamental policy concerns toward the 
127. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 964·65 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). 
128. !d. at 960, 965-67. 
129. The opinion of the Court emphasized this historical fact in explaining why the suspension decision was 
legislative in nature and therefore subject to the bicameralism and presentation requirements. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
at 954. 
130. The legislative branch is given power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization." U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
131. Madison objected to a proposal to require that members of the Senate have been citizens for 14 years 
"because it will put it out of the power of the Nat[iona]l Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to 
confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787, at 236 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937). 
. 132. Supporters of the legislative veto nevertheless concede that the use of the veto in deportation cases raises 
Important constitutional questions. See Dry, The Congressional Veto and the Separation of Powers, in THE PRESI-
DENcy IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, supra note 65, at 195, 222-23. 
133. E.g., Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C.L. 
REv. 423,470-71 (1978); Strauss, supra note 121, at 805-06; Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and 
the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 314 (1989). 
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minutiae of administration, give inordinate weight to sophisticated or well-con-
nected interest groups, enhance the role of committee staffs, destabilize the poli-
cymaking process by increasing the likelihood of stalemate arising from conflicts 
between agencies and Congress unmediated by presidential participation, and 
complicate judicial review of regulations that are not vetoed by the 
legislature. 134 
The distinction between regulatory and nonregulatory vetoes may have less 
significance than its advocates suppose, however. First, it is by no means obvious 
that the reorganization, budgetary, and salary questions subsumed under the 
"nonregulatory" label are purely housekeeping matters, as the public outcry 
over the proposed 1989 federal pay raise attests. 135 More importantly, a regula-
tory veto typically prevents the government from taking action against private 
parties.l36 To the extent that the legislative veto of an agency rule prevents the 
government from harming private interests, the device might be said incre-
mentally to promote liberty, one of the core values in our constitutional 
scheme. 137 
Opponents of the legislative veto might respond that this particular mecha-
nism, by advantaging well-organized or powerful private interests, aggravates 
the problem of faction, the avoidance of which was another cardinal principle 
for the framers of the Constitution.138 Perhaps this concern, coupled with the 
difficulty of meaningfully distinguishing among the varieties of legislative ve-
toes, prompted the Court to paint with so broad a brush in Chadha. Whatever 
the explanation, within days of that ruling the Justices summarily affirmed two 
lower court rulings invalidating one- and two-house regulatory vetoes.139 
One difficulty with this admittedly potent response is that it proves too 
much. Even without the legislative veto, Congress retains numerous alternative 
devices to prevent administrative overreaching.uo The details of regulation typi-
134. See, e.g., BruiT, Legislarive Forma/icy, Adminisrrarive Rarionaliry, 63 TEx. L. REV. 207,221-22 (1984); 
BruiT & Gellhorn, Congressional Comrol of Adminisrrarive Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 1369, 1381-82, 1409-20 (1977); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congres-
sional PoiVer, 68 VA. L. REV. 253, 267-85 (1982). 
IJ5. See L. fiSHER, supra note 74, at 167; Hook, How the Pay-Raise Strategy Came Unraveled, 47 CoNG. 
Q. WEEKLY REP. 264 ( 1989); Nathanson, supra note 110, at 1090. 
136. It was in this sense that the factual setting in Chadha was anomalous. The legislative veto exercised by 
the House of Representatives in that case burdened Jagdish Chadha by requiring him to leave the United States 
for an uncertain fate. 
137. See Nathanson, supra note 110, at 1089-90. 
138. Sunstein, supra note 3, at 435-36. See THE fEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-84 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961 ). 
139. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983), ajj'g Consumer 
Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (!-house veto); United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 
1216 (1983), ajj'g Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en bane) (per curiam) 
(2-house veto). 
140. Among these are limiting agency jurisdiction, see, e.g., Levitas & Brand, Congressional Review of Ex-
ecurive and Agency Acrions After Chada [sic]: "The Son of Legislative Veto" Lives On, 72 GEo. L.J. 801, 803 
(1984); placing restrictive riders on appropriations measures, see, e.g., Devins, Regulation of Government Agen-
cies Through Limirarion Riders, 1987 DUKE L.J. 456; Fisher, supra note I 10, at 28-29; enacting "report and 
wait" provisions that delay the effective date of regulations until Congress has had an opportunity to pass legisla-
tion preventing them from taking effect, see, e.g., L. TRIBE, CoNSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 77 ( 1985); and adopting 
procedural devices that closely approximate but do not exactly replicate the legislative veto, see, e.g., Breyer, The 
Legislative Vera Afrer Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 792-95 (1984). See generally R. PIERCE. JR .. S. SHAPIRO & P. 
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cally concern low-visibility matters of intense concern to a few but of much less 
concern to the public at large. These are precisely the kinds of issues as to 
which sophisticated, well-organized private interests are likely to enjoy dispro-
portionate advantages throughout the political process. 141 Perhaps the legislative 
veto poses unique risks of aggravating the problem of faction. No reliable evi-
dence supports this proposition, however. The principal empirical study of the 
operation and effect of the veto failed to examine programs in which regulations 
were not subject to legislative vetoes. 142 At most, then, we can conclude that 
powerful special interests might find it marginally more difficult to prevail 
under different procedural devices, but many of the harmful effects of the legis-
lative veto have been documented in congressional oversight of administrative 
regulation that is not subject to such a veto. 143 
In other words, the debate over the legislative veto concerns "matters of 
degree" rather than of kind.144 Separation of powers problems may involve "ef-
fects at the margin,"145 but in a field in which distinctions are often evanescent 
one might pause before attributing constitutional significance to small differ-
ences. The legislative veto may well promote inefficient policies and reward stra-
tegic behavior by rent-seeking private interests, a point to which we shall return 
in Part III. 146 Nevertheless, if "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact 
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"147 it seems unlikely that article I incor-
porates Arrow's Impossibility Theorem148 or any other tenet of public choice 
theory. 
VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS 75-78 ( 1985); Kaiser, Congressional Control of Executive Actions 
in the Aftermath of the Chadha Decision, 36 ADMIN. L. REv. 239, 243-70 ( 1984). 
141. SeeM. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS 99-101, 103-04 (1981); K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, 
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 314-17,395-98 (1986); Evans, PAC Contributions and Roll-
Call Vocing: Conditional Power, in INTEREST GROUP POLITICS 114, 116-22 (A. Cigler & B. Loomis 2d ed. 1986); 
Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEx. L. REv. 873, 885-87 (1987); see also Sunstein, 
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 48-49, 52-53, 59-64 (1985). 
142. Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn examined only the five programs that had provided "[m]ost of the 
current federal experience with legislative veto of rulemaking." Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 134, at 1371. The 
omission of any program in which substantive rules were not subject to legislative veto prevents reliable inferences 
about the distinctive impact of the veto upon the programs that were studied. See, e.g., D. CAMPBELL & J. STAN-
LEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 6-7 ( 1963). 
143. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 134, at 1382 n.45, 1386-87, 1389, 1422-23; Robinson, The Federal Com-
munications Commission: An Essay on Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. REv. 169, 201-02 (1918). 
144. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 134, at 1420. 
145. Martin, supra note 134, at 294. 
146. Much recent legal commentary on the legislative process draws upon the economic theory of legislation, 
which posits that legislators act only out of self-interest. For a critical summary, see Farber & Frickey, supra note 
141, at 890-901. Although many commentators have rested their criticisms of the legislative veto on noneconomic 
grounds, Professor Bruff explicitly invoked public choice theory as an important part of his analysis. Bruff, supra 
note 134, at 214-18. Dean Gellhorn, his sometime coauthor, see G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (3d ed. 1986); Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note 134, has relied upon that theory in his 
writing on other separation of powers issues. See, e.g., Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative 
Delegation, 68 CoRNELL L. REV. I (1982). 
147. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
148. See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VA LUES (2d ed. 1963). 
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C. The Deficit, the Comptroller General, and the Removal Power 
The next conflict between Congress and the President to reach the Su-
preme Court concerned the validity of the central feature of the Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollings Act.149 That statute, passed in response to widespread concern 
over persistent and unprecedentedly large federal deficits/50 called for a phased 
elimination of the annual budget shortfall over a six-year period. It did so by 
imposing automatic, across-the-board spending cuts if the projected deficit at 
the beginning of the fiscal year exceeded the statutory maximum for that year. 
The cuts, under a process called sequestration, would become effective unless 
legislation embodying some alternative way to reduce the deficit to the statutory 
limit were adopted.151 In essence, the threat of sequestration was intended to 
loom large enough to force the political branches to reduce the deficit but small 
enough to discourage them from repealing or otherwise avoiding the law's 
requirements. 152 
The ensuing litigation ultimately centered upon the role of the Comptroller 
General in implementing Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Under this legislation, the 
Comptroller had the authority both to calculate the projected deficit in case the 
independent figures of the Office of Management and Budget and the Congres-
sional Budget Office differed, and to implement a sequestration order if that 
became necessary.153 In Bowsher v. Synar/ 54 the Supreme Court held that the 
assignment of these responsibilities to the Comptroller violated the separation of 
powers doctrine because, under certain circumstances, he could be removed 
from office by the unilateral action of Congress. As in Chadha, the Court em-
phasized the importance of insulating the branches from each other, even at the 
expense of governmental efficiency.155 
The reasoning underlying the Bowsher ruling ran as follows: (I) An officer 
controlled by Congress may not constitutionally exercise executive power; (2) 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings vested the Comptroller General with executive 
power; (3) the procedures for removing the Comptroller rendered him sub-
149. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, tit. II, 99 Stat. 
1037, 1063, as amended by Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 
No. 100-119, 101 Stat. 754 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901-922 (Supp. V 1987)). 
150. In both absolute and relative terms, the deficit had reached previously unknown levels for the peacetime 
economy. By I 985, the deficit exceeded $200 billion, a figure larger than the entire federal budget only I 5 years 
earlier. Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REv. 593, 
596 ( 1988 ). As a percentage of gross national product, the deficit between I 980 and I 986 was more than I 0 times 
as large as it had been in the I 950s. See Ellwood, The Politics of the Enactment and Implementation of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings: Why Congress Connor Address the Deficit Dilemma, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 553, 553 n.2 
( 1988 ). One contemporaneous official estimate projected that, under plausible budgetary and economic assump-
tions, the national debt would more than double between I 985 and !990. Entin, supra note I 5, at 706 n.28. 
I 51. For detailed explanations of the operation of the Act, see Entin, supra note 15, at 706-09; Stith, supra 
note 150, at 625-29. 
!52. Elliott, Why Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506, 519 
(1989); Stith, supra note !50, at 624 & n.l91. 
!53. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of !985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, § 251, 99 Stat. 
1037, I 063 (amended 1987). 
154. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
I 55. The Court concluded its opinion in Bowsher by quoting its observation in Chadha that the efficiency, 
convenience, and utility cf a given procedure was irrelevant to its constitutional validity. !d. at 736. See supra text 
accompanying note I I 6. 
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servient to Congress; so ( 4) the Comptroller General could not perform the 
functions assigned to him under the Act_l56 For present purposes, the important 
questions are the definition of the functions assigned to the Comptroller General 
and the significance of the removal procedure. 
Defining executive power, the Court emphasized that the Comptroller Gen-
eral would "[i]nterpre[t] a law enacted by Congress to implement the legisla-
tive mandate," which was "the very essence of 'execution' of the law."157 In one 
sense, this definition is consistent with the view of executive power in Chadha, 
which stressed that Congress could not participate in implementing one of its 
laws except by passing a new statute.168 In another, however, it departs from 
the Chadha approach by focusing upon the character of the action performed 
rather than upon the identity of the actor performing it. 
More troubling than this methodological inconsistency is the definition it-
self. After all, interpreting a law and applying it to a particular set of facts 
describes adjudication at least as clearly as it does execution. 159 Further, defin-
ing the responsibilities of the Comptroller General under Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings as executive might imply that Congress would violate the Constitution 
by reducing expenditures for specific federal programs in order to lower the 
deficit. 160 
Assuming that the Act conferred executive powers upon the Comptroller 
General, however, the conclusion that the removal procedure rendered that offi-
cial subservient to Congress raises additional problems. At the most basic level, 
the Constitution has very little to say about removal. The one explicit reference 
to the subject states that all civil officers may be removed through impeach-
ment.161 That solitary provision might implicitly exclude all other methods of 
removal, but political practice from the First Congress onward rejected so nar-
row a view. 162 
Not until this century did the Supreme Court attempt to impose constitu-
tional ground rules in the area. In Myers v. United States/ 63 the Court invali-
156. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 721-34. 
157. !d. at 733. 
158. See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 954-55, 958 ( 1983). 
159. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 56-57 (1932); Elliott, Regularing rhe Deficic Afcer Bowsher v. 
Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 317, 325 (1987); Gwyn, The Indererminacy of rhe Separarion of Powers and the 
Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 482 (1989). 
160. A separate aspect of the Bowsher decision shows that such congressional action would not violate the 
Constitution. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings contained a fallback provision that established special procedures for 
promulgating a sequestration order by joint resolution if the primary mechanism were invalidated. Bowsher, 478 
U.S. at 718-19. The existence of the fallback provision persuaded the Court to invalidate the Comptroller Gen-
eral's role in implementing the statute rather than strike down the removal procedure. !d. at 735-36. For Justice 
Stevens, the existence of these alternative methods of implementing the statute suggested that the duties at issue 
had a "chameleon-like quality." !d. at 750 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). For further discussion of 
these problems, see Entin, supra note 15, at 756-58, 782-84. 
161. U.S. CaNST. art. II,§ 4: "The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States shall 
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors." 
162. See Entin, supra note 15, at 712-27. 
163. 272 U.S. 52 (1926). For detailed analyses of this decision, see E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL 
POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION ( 1927); J. HART, TENURE OF OFFICE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION ( 1930); En-
tin, supra note 15, at 728-38. 
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dated a statute that required the advice and consent of the Senate as a prereq-
uisite to the dismissal of most local postmasters. Underlying this ruling was the 
proposition that the President possessed unfettered power to remove those non-
judicial appointees who assisted in the performance of his constitutional obliga-
tion faithfully to execute the laws.164 The subsequent ruling in Humphrey's Ex-
ecutor v. United States165 upheld a cause requirement for the removal of 
members of the Federal Trade Commission. In so doing, the Court limited the 
rule of Myers to "purely executive" officers. 166 
The statute creating the position of Comptroller General specified that the 
incumbent could be removed, other than by impeachment, only for cause and 
only through the passage of a joint resolution.167 Because a joint resolution is 
subject to the bicameralism and presentation requirements applicable to a 
bill, 168 Congress has the initiative over the process of removing the Comptroller 
and could oust that official over the determined opposition of the President. The 
Court in Bowsher therefore viewed the statute as authorizing the legislative 
branch alone to dismiss the Comptroller.169 Because the power to remove was 
the power to control, this procedure rendered the Comptroller "subservient to 
Congress."170 It followed that this subservience precluded the Comptroller from 
exercising the executive functions conferred upon him by Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings.171 
The Court virtually apologized for the inconvenience of this conclusion, 
which it regarded as following inexorably from fundamental constitutional 
premises. 172 In a purely formal sense, the reasoning in Bowsher does follow 
from Myers and Humphrey's Executor, whatever the infirmities of those opin-
ions. A system that values adherence to precedent should attach some weight to 
this fact. Yet a closer look suggests that the procedure for removing the Comp-
troller General posed few separation of powers risks. 
To begin with, while the officials in those earlier cases actually had been 
dismissed, the Comptroller has remained securely in place both before and since 
the Bowsher litigation. More fundamentally, the real significance of the power 
to remove has been greatly exaggerated. Presidents can control their appointees 
164. Myers, 272 U.S. at 117. 
165. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The scholarly reaction to this opinion has been almost uniformly negative. See, 
e.g., Gilford, The Separation of Powers Doctrine and the Regulatory Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 55 GEo. 
WAsH. L. REv. 441, 459-61 (1987); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 41, 92-94; Nathanson, 
supra note 110, at 1100-01; Strauss, supra ·note 23, at 611-12. See generally Entin, supra note 15, at 738-49. 
166. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628. The Court later held that presidential appointees exercising adjudi-
catory functions enjoyed protection against arbitrary discharge. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
For further discussion of this case, see Entin, supra note 15, at 749-52. 
167. 31 U.S.C. § 703(e)(l) (1982). The statutory grounds include permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect 
of duty, malfeasance, and conduct involving moral turpitude. The middle three grounds are identical to the provi-
sions justifying the removal of members of the Federal Trade Commission that were upheld in Humphrey's Exec-
utor. 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1982). 
168. United States V. California, 332 U.S. 19, 28 (1947); 7 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF ~HE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 333-34 (1977). 
169. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 728 & n.7 (1986). 
170. /d. at 730; see also id. at 726. 
171. /d. at 732. 
172. See id. at 722, 736. 
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more effectively by means other than dismissing or threatening to dismiss them. 
Removals have costs as well as benefits, a fact that makes the importance of 
who may discharge officials and on what grounds a matter more of symbolic 
than of substantive significance.173 Further, even if the President had the sole 
and unfettered power to remove, Congress retains a broad array of theoretically 
less drastic but empirically more useful controls over the salary and working 
conditions of officials exercising executive power, controls that could effectively 
force such officials to resign even when the President earnestly desired them to 
remain.174 
This does not mean that direct congressional participation in the removal 
of executive officers is entirely benign, as the experience under the Tenure of 
Office Act175 demonstrates. Nevertheless, when Bowsher was decided no Comp-
troller General had been removed or even threatened with removal in the sixty-
five years since the position was created.176 Moreover, a broad array of institu-
tional factors-including the Comptroller's right to a pretermination hearing, 
the difficulty of mustering the two-thirds vote in both houses to oust him over 
presidential opposition, and his ineligibility for reappointment-militate against 
the notion that the Comptroller is subservient to Congress and therefore might 
trim his sails in performing his duties under the deficit-reduction law.177 
173. Entin, supra note 15, at 777-81. But see Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics 
and the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1080 n.4 (1988). 
From the President's standpoint, the political cost of removals and the availability of less drastic alternative 
controls help to explain the low incidence of actual dismissals. From the perspective of a presidential appointee, 
the paucity of removals reduces the effectiveness of even the threat of discharge as a means of deterring conduct 
that might warrant removal from office. This reasoning would follow by analogy to the idea of a link between 
effective enforcement and deterrence in the criminal law. See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANC-
TION 286-88 (1968); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE 160-61 (1973). But see PANEL ON RESEARCH ON 
DETERRENT AND INCAPACITATIVE EFFECTS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: 
ESTtMATit<G THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES 4-8, 22-59 {1978) (demonstrating the diffi-
culty of proving a causal link between risk of noncapital sanctions and deterrence of criminal behavior); id. at 8-9, 
59-63 (analyzing the difficulty of determining the deterrent effect of capital punishment). Of course, especially 
risk-averse presidential appointees might be deterred from doing anything that presents even a remote risk of 
removal. Cf S. KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 151 (5th ed. 1989) ("certainty of 
punishment is important only as it contributes to the appearance of certainty"); F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, 
supra, at 161-63 (emphasizing the importance of subjective as well as objective judgments in assessing deterrent 
effects). 
174. Entin, supra note 15, at 760. All of these devices are entirely consistent with the reasoning of Myers. 
See id. at 734. In addition, Chief Justice Taft's opinion for the Court in that case recognized that Congress could 
defeat the President's unfettered prerogative to remove many of his nonjudicial appointees by the simple expedient 
of denominating them inferior officers chosen by department heads rather than by the chief executive. See Myers 
V. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126-27 {1926); see also W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 70-71 
(1916) (suggesting that the President be required to appoint only cabinet members and a single undersecretary in 
each department, with all other offices filled by civil servants having permanent tenure). 
175. Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867), amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1869, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6, repealed by Act of 
Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500. 
176. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 778, 784 (Biackmun, J., dissenting); Entin, supra note 15, at 760 & n.263. 
177. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 770-73 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 784-85 & nA (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
At the same time, the Comptroller traditionally has enjoyed a close relationship with Congress. The Court 
correctly remarked that both the legislative branch and various Comptrollers have commented upon that relation-
ship, Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 731-32, one reflected in the wide range of other functions which that official performs 
for Congress, see id. at 741-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). This raises the possibility that the 
Comptroller might show excessive sensitivity to the perceived wishes of the legislature in performing his duties 
under Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, notwithstanding the countervailing factors discussed in the text. Any uncer-
tainty over the Comptroller's incentives might have suggested that litigation concerning his subservience was pre-
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Unfortunately, the Court's single-minded focus upon the abstract details of 
the removal provision obscured a more significant separation of powers issue 
raised by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. This statute effectively enabled elected of-
ficials charged with making fundamental judgments about the size and shape of 
government to avoid their responsibilities by delegating those judgments to ap-
pointed officials who are not directly accountable to the electorate. This view 
suggests that the budget occupies so important a place in our system that the 
political branches may not delegate their responsibility to make budgetary deci-
sions of the magnitude contemplated by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.178 Although 
the Act was attacked on more traditional delegation grounds, the Court did not 
discuss the merits of this claim.179 
Resolving this issue would have posed real difficulties. Indeed, acceptance 
of the notion that the political branches may not delegate fundamental budget-
ary decisions might have called into question the validity of other aspects of the 
administrative state. The existence of precedents on removal provided a conven-
tional, if unsatisfying, basis for the result in Bowsher. 180 Nevertheless, the im-
plausibility of the assumptions underlying the Court's removal jurisprudence 
suggests that these decisions embody an enormous legal fiction. Still, many 
commentators view the resolution of the debate over the removal power as es-
sential to the preservation of a unitary executive and the maintenance of liberty 
under a regime of separated powers. 181 Perhaps this view is correct, but the 
limited empirical significance of this power makes it a small tail to wag so large 
a dog.ts2 
mature. See Elliott, supra note 159, at 332-36. The Court, however, dismissed the ripeness question in a footnote. 
Bowsher, 4 78 U.S. at 727 n.S. 
178. For further discussion of this point and of the difficulty of drawing principled distinctions between those 
functions that are delegable and those that are not, see Entin, supra note 15, at 784-90. 
179. See Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736 n.lO. The dissenters dismissed this claim in footnotes. /d. at 764 n.5 
(White, J., dissenting); id. at 778 n.l (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The district court rejected the delegation argu-
ment on the merits. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1385-89 (D.D.C. 1986) (3-judge court). 
180. For efforts to construct a less troublesome rationale for the result in Bowsher, see Strauss, supra note 
10, at 498-500, 519-21; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 496. 
181. E.g., Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19, 34-36; Miller, supra 
note 165, at 58-63, 96-97. 
This view is not confined to academics. The arguments in Bowsher implicitly raised questions concerning the 
constitutionality of so-called independent agencies. It will be recalled that Humphrey's Executor upheld the valid-
ity of for-cause removal provisions for members of the FTC. That ruling provided a judicial imprimatur for such 
agencies. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DuKE L.J. 779, 781-82. In 
Bowsher, the Solicitor General hinted that he shared those constitutional doubts but did not expressly urge the 
overruling of Humphrey's Executor. Brief for the United States at 46 n.32, Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714 (No. 85-
1377). The implications of the Solicitor General's position elicited extensive discussion at oral argument, see 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act - Separation of Powers, 54 U.S.L.W. 3709, 3710 (1986), and prompted the 
Court to include a footnote disavowing any intention to cast doubt on the constitutionality of independent agen-
cies, Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 n.4. 
Despite the Solicitor General's diffidence, other executive-branch officials have expressed hostility toward the 
idea of such agencies. See Miller, supra note 165, at 47-48; Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1319 n.471 (1986); Verkuil, supra, at 788-90. 
182. Some analysts have urged increased presidential participation in coordinating and implementing policy 
based upon conceptions of executive power in which the removal question occupies a distinctly secondary place. 
E.g., Strauss, supra note 23, at 599-602, 653-67; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 452-63. 
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D. The Independent Counsel and the Control of Prosecution 
As the discussion of Buckley indicated, the legacy of Watergate included 
legislation designed to remedy campaign fund-raising abuses. That scandal also 
prompted passage of a measure requiring the appointment of an independent 
counsel in any future case involving credible allegations of criminal misbehavior 
by persons in or close to the White House. The independent counsel provision 
was an important part of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978/83 which was 
adopted out of concern that the Department of Justice had not dealt adequately 
with Watergate-related matters. 184 In essence, this provision sought to insulate 
the Department from politically sensitive cases on the theory that the executive 
branch cannot be trusted to investigate itself.185 
The Court upheld the constitutionality of this arrangement in Morrison v. 
Olson. 186 The reasoning supporting this conclusion differed conspicuously from 
the approach taken in Chadha and Bowsher. Rather than emphasizing the es-
sential separateness of the branches, the opinion focused upon whether the inde-
pendent counsel system unduly interfered with the performance of executive 
functions. 187 As in the earlier cases taking this tack, Morris on did not define 
how much interference would violate the Constitution. Perhaps more strikingly, 
it gave only cursory attention to the purposes of the separation of powers doc-
trine and the justification for the disputed statute. The Court's essentially ad 
hoc balancing approach elicited a passionate dissent from Justice Scalia, who 
lamented what he saw as the demise of "our former constitutional system."188 
The constitutional objection to the independent counsel law rested upon the 
proposition that law enforcement is a quintessentially executive function and 
that the Ethics Act impermissibly deprives the President of control over that 
function. The argument emphasized that the Constitution vested "[t]he execu-
tive power" in the President/89 who also was given the duty to "take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed."190 The constitutional infirmity arose because 
the statute conferred the power to appoint an independent counsel upon a spe-
cial court191 and limited the grounds upon which such a counsel could be re-
183. Pub. L. No. 95-521, tit. VI, 92 Stat. !824, 1867-73 (1978) (current version codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 
591-599 (Supp. V 1987)). 
184. The Ethics Act also imposed substantive restrictions upon the activities of high-level executive officials 
after they leave government. Those provisions are beyond the scope of this discussion but they present important 
questions in their own right. See. e.g., United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert .. denied, 110 S. 
Ct. 564 ( 1989). 
185. See In reSealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 527 (D.C. Cir.) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., dissenting). rev'd sub 
nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); cf Sunstein, supra note 3, at 467 (checks on abuse of authority 
are justified in part because "foxes should not guard henhouses"). 
The Act applies to cases involving the President and Vice-President as well as to persons holding cabinet and 
subcabinet rank and to top officials of the President's campaign organization. 28 U.S.C. § 591(b) (Supp. V !987). 
186. I 08 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). 
187. /d. at 2620-22. 
188. /d. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
189. U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. I. 
l90. !d. § 3. Although Justice Scalia did not rely upon this provision, the lower court emphasized this presi-
dential duty as an important basis for invalidating the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics Act. In re 
Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 488-89 (D.C. Cir.), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). 
191. See 28 U.S.C. § 49 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
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moved. 192 Accordingly, this arrangement was said to contravene the teachings 
of both Buckley and Myers by conferring duties exercisable only by an officer 
of the United States upon someone chosen in violation of the constitutionally 
mandated procedure for selecting such officials, and by limiting the grounds 
upon which a person performing purely executive functions could be dismissed. 
Although it conceded that the independent counsel performed executive 
functions, 193 the Morrison opinion rebuffed these objections. The selection pro-
cedure complied with constitutional strictures because an independent counsel is 
an inferior officer having limited duties, jurisdiction, and tenure, and subject to 
removal for cause by the Attorney GeneraJ.l94 The removal provision was no 
more troublesome even though an independent counsel might be thought to hold 
a "purely executive" office. Despite apparently contrary language in 
Humphrey's Executor/95 the Court stated its "present considered view"196 that 
for-cause limitations upon removal should pass muster unless "they impede the 
President's ability to perform his constitutional duty." 197 Under this flexible 
standard, neither the removal limitation nor the statute taken as a whole "un-
duly trammel[ed] on executive authority."198 
The formalist objection to this analysis gains some force from the elliptical 
quality of the majority opinion. If investigation and prosecution of possible vio-
lations of the criminal law are quintessentially executive functions, the prospect 
of an independent counsel appointed by a court and subject to only limited pres-
idential control appears deeply problematical in a government with a supposedly 
unitary executive. 199 The Court's reliance upon a relatively indeterminate bal-
ancing approach, coupled with its somewhat diffident treatment of the concerns 
over the possible conflict of interest inherent in having the Attorney General 
192. An independent counsel is removable "only by the personal action of the Attorney General and only for 
good cause, physical disability, mental incapacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the perform-
ance of such independent counsel's duties." !d. § 596(a)(l ). The decision to discharge an independent counsel is 
subject to review by the special court. !d. § 596(a)(3). 
193. Morrison, I 08 S. Ct. at 2619. 
194. !d. at 2608-09. This conclusion is less than obvious, but neither is it implausible. See Blumolf, supra 
note 173, at 1156-60. The Ethics Act confers upon an independent counsel the "full power" of the Attorney 
General and the Department of Justice in all matters within the counsel's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (Supp. 
V 1987 ). In that sense, an independent counsel is not truly subordinate to anyone in the executive branch and thus 
might be viewed as an officer of the United States rather than as an inferior officer. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 
2631-35 (Scalia, J., dissenting). At the same time the Court has characterized as inferior officers some officials 
who lacked any clearly identifiable superiors. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397-98 ( 1880) (commissioners 
appointed to oversee congressional election). Hence, subordinateness may not be a necessary attribute of an infer-
ior officer. 
195. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627-28 (1935). 
196. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2618. 
197. !d. at 2619. 
198. !d. In assessing the Ethics Act as a whole, the Court emphasized that the executive branch retains 
"sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally 
assigned duties" with respect to law enforcement. /d. at 2622. 
199. See Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626-28, 2629-31, 2636-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Carter, The 
Independent Counsel Men, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 108-16 (1988); Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic 
Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 313, 314-17, 352-58 (1989). 
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supervlSlng investigations of the administration of which he is part,200 might 
contribute to the difficulty. 
A more complete argument based upon both the conflict-of-interest prob-
lem and the values served by the separation of powers might have proceeded 
along the following lines. The Constitution sought to diffuse power, among other 
purposes, to prevent the accumulation of unchecked authority that could lead to 
oppression and tyranny. The prospect of the executive branch investigating itself 
poses a risk of self-interested decisionmaking that could result in unjustified 
failures to pursue wrongdoing by government officials. Although the President 
has the duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"201 that duty 
restricts his discretion to dispense with or refuse to enforce applicable laws.202 
Meanwhile, Congress may "make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into Execution ... all ... Powers vested" in the federal govern-
ment or any federal officer, including the President.203 
On this reasoning, Congress could, as it did in the Ethics Act, pass a stat-
ute conferring limited authority upon a court to appoint and supervise an inde-
pendent counsel, particularly when the Attorney General alone determines 
whether an independent counsel will be appointed at all204 and the Attorney 
General's recommendation provides the basis for defining the counsel's jurisdic-
tion.205 The removal procedure, under which the Attorney General may dismiss 
but only for cause, recognizes the executive branch's authority while protecting 
against the arbitrary discharge of an official occupying a potentially vulnerable 
position.206 Moreover, the statute can be said to minimize the risk of congres-
200. The Court discussed conflict-of-interest considerations only in connection with the challenge to the 
method of selecting an independent counsel. After concluding that an independent counsel may properly be char-
acterized as an inferior officer, the majority found no unconstitutional "incongruity" in the provision empowering 
the special court to make the appointment. The language of the appointments clause did not preclude judicial 
appointment of an official performing executive functions, and "the most logical place to put [the appointing 
authority that Congress was unwilling in this instance to entrust to the President] was in the Judicial Branch." 
Morris on, I 08 S. Ct. at 2611. 
201. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
202. Shane, The Separation of Powers and the Rule of Law: The Virtues of "Seeing the Trees", 30 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 375, 380 (1989); Sunstein, supra note 3, at 476; Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent 
Officers as Checks on Abuses of Execueive Power, 63 B.U.L. REv. 59, 90 (1983). 
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
204. An independent counsel may be appointed only upon the request of the Attorney General. 28 U.S. C. §§ 
592(a)-(d), 593(b)(I) (Supp. V 1987). The special court may not appoint an independent counsel on its own 
initiative, and the Attorney General's decision not to seek such an appointment is immune from judicial review. 
Dellums v. Smith, 797 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1986); Banzhaf v. Smith, 737 F.2d 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
205. The special court defines, and may expand, an independent counsel's jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b)-
(c) (Supp. V 1987). An independent counsel may not obtain jurisdiction over any matter or individual in the face 
of objections by the Attorney General, however. !d. § 593(c)(2)(B); see also In re Olson, 818 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 
1987). 
206. See Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (inferring protection against arbitrary discharge for 
officials performing adjudication from statute under which officials were appointed despite absence of provision 
relatmg to removal); l. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 253 (2d ed. 1988); Tiefer, supra note 202, at 
96-97. 
The Ethics Act authorizes the special court to review the Attomey General's decision to remove an indepen-
dent counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3) ( 1982 & Supp. V 1987). This provision does not seem troublesome, although 
the prospect of judicial review might well deter the Attorney General from removing an independent counsel. A 
~ubstantial body of statutory and case law now exists that any executive official might invoke in a!! effort to obtain 
JUdicial review of his ouster. E.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Board of Regents v. 
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sional aggrandizement by conferring authority upon a court rather than the leg-
islature. Thus, the independent counsel provision encroaches only minimally 
upon executive autonomy in an area where unfettered executive authority 
presents foreseeable risks to the rule of law. 
This conclusion gains additional vitality from an important historical fact: 
The practices of the states and the early federal government raise serious doubts 
that law enforcement really is a quintessentially executive function. Perhaps due 
to the arguments presented in the Morrison litigation, it was generally accepted 
that the powers at issue were executive.207 Those arguments, in turn, might 
have been shaped by the many judicial statements to this effect.208 In fact, how-
ever, both at the time the Constitution was ratified and for decades thereafter, 
several states provided for the appointment of prosecutors by courts or legisla-
tive bodies.209 At the national level, the executive branch, in the person of the 
Attorney General, did not gain centralized control over litigation involving the 
federal government until 1870.210 Before then, most federal litigation was con-
ducted on a part-time basis by private practitioners who had little contact with 
the President or other executive officials.211 In England during the iate eight-
eenth century, private prosecution of criminal cases was common, a practice 
undoubtedly known to the framers. 212 For many years after the ratification of 
the Constitution, private citizens played an important role in enforcing federal 
criminallaws,213 and Congress assigned numerous law enforcement responsibili-
ties to state officials who were not subject to plenary presidential control.214 This 
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (I 972); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311, 317-18 ( 1903); Reagan v. United States, 
182 u.s. 419,426 (1901). 
207. See supra text accompanying note 193. Judge Ginsburg, dissenting in the court of appeals, also viewed 
prosecution as "indisputably an executive task" but questioned whether it was a "core" function of that branch. In 
reSealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 526 (D.C. Cir.) (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Morrison v. 
Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 {1988). 
208. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,693 (1974); The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. {7 Wall.) 
454, 458-59 {1869); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 {5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967); United 
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hauberg, 381 U.S. 935 (1965). 
209. Gwyn, supra note 159, at 494-99; Shane, Independent Po/icymaking and Presidential Power: A Consti-
tutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 603-05 (1989). 
210. P. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 101 (1978); Tiefer, supra note 202, at 91. 
211. Sealed Case, 838 F.2d at 526-27 (Ruth Bader Ginsburg, J., dissenting); L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS 
406-11 (1948); Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 539, 558 (1988); 
Krent, Executive Control over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 275, 
286-90 ( 1989). The lack of centralized executive direction is reflected in the refusal of Attorney General William 
Wirt to respond to an inquiry from a federal district attorney. I Op. Att'y Gen. 608, 609-11 (1823), cited in 
Krent, supra note 124, at 1319 n.273. 
212. Gwyn, supra note 159, at 500-01; Krent, supra note 211, at 290-92; Shane. supra note 202, at 379; 
Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private Prosecution, 25 AM. U.L. REv. 754, 758 (1976). 
213. See Krent, supra note 211, at 292-303. 
Even today control over federal criminal prosecution is not completely centralized. The Supreme Court has 
recently upheld the validity of judicial appointment of private attorneys to prosecute cases of criminal contempt. 
Young v. United States ex ref. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793-801 (1987). In addition, United States 
Attorneys retain considerable autonomy in the conduct of litigation despite their nominal subservience to the 
Attorney General. Bruff, supra note 211, at 558-59. Further, many federal agencies have the right to go to court 
without clearance from the Department of Justice. Tiefer, supra note 202, at 91-92. 
214. Krent, supra note 211, at 304-06, 308-10; see also Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State 
Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545, 551-75 (1925). 
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historical record, if it does not refute the formalist objections to the Ethics Act, 
at least weakens them considerably. 
However those objections are resolved, a more subtle, and to many modern 
minds more troubling, argument also has been advanced against the indepen-
dent counsel mechanism. An independent counsel focuses upon a specific indi-
vidual. The counsel, by virtue of her independence, does not operate under the 
constraints that affect prosecutors subject to presidential supervision and the 
traditions of the Department of Justice which operate to temper excessive zeal. 
Thus, the independent counsel's professional isolation, lack of political account-
ability, and need to justify the existence of the office pose severe threats to the 
due process rights of officials subject to the Ethics Act.215 
One might respond to this concern in three ways. First, this due process 
argument implies that overzealous independent counsel will single out accused 
officials for unreasonably harsh treatment. Yet the Supreme Court generally 
has reacted skeptically to claims of selective enforcement216 and prosecutorial 
vindictiveness. 217 Thus, whatever the cogency of the due process argument, this 
objection cannot justify facial invalidation of the independent counsel provisions 
of the Ethics Act. 
Second, experience under the Act suggests that these concerns are at least 
premature. Several investigations by independent counsel have concluded with-
out indictment, even in situations in which the counsel elected as a matter of 
discretion not to proceed despite evidence of statutory violations.218 Indeed, in at 
least one case the target of allegations of wrongdoing actually requested the 
appointment of an independent counsel to clear the air. 219 The record to date is 
not conclusive, of course, and one conviction obtained by an independent coun-
sel has been overturned on appeal.220 These due process questions nevertheless 
raise legitimate concerns. At this point, though, the validity of those concerns 
remains unclear. 
Third, these due process objections might prove too much. Any special 
prosecutor appointed to investigate alleged wrongdoing by executive officials 
will function outside the framework and institutional traditions of the Depart-
ment of Justice. Thus, all of the due process vices inherent in the Ethics Act 
would apply to a special prosecutor appointed by the President or Attorney 
General. Yet Justice Scalia, who so strenuously denounced the Ethics Act, ac-
cepted the legitimacy of special prosecutors chosen in response to political pres-
sure on the executive branch.221 This apparent inconsistency does not destroy 
215. These objections are distilled from the final section of Justice Scalia's opinion in Morrison. See Morri-
son v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2637-40 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
216. See. e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607-10 (1985); United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 
114, 123-25 (1979). 
217. See, e.g., Alabama v. Smith, 109 S. Ct. 2201 (1989); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978); 
Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1972). But see Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 24-29 (1974). 
218. The most celebrated example to date involves the decision of independent counsel James McKay not to 
seek indictments against former Attorney General Edwin Meese. See Report of Independent Counsel In re Edwin 
Meese Ill at 51-52, 73-76, 95-99 (D.C. Cir. Indep. Couns. Div. July 5, 1988). 
219. See Deaver v. Seymour, 822 F.2d 66, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
220. United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 564 ( 1989). 
221. Morrison, I 08 S. Ct. at 2629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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the objection to the Ethics Act, but it does suggest that perhaps a deeper fault 
in the statute arises from the scope of its coverage and the threshold for its 
invocation rather than from the procedures for selecting and removing an inde-
pendent counsel. These concerns, however, may go more to the wisdom of the 
Act than to its constitutionality. We shall return to this issue in Part III. 
E. Sentencing, Taxing, and Delegation 
The final set of cases to be discussed arose last Term and presented chal-
lenges to federal statutes on delegation grounds. One concerned the constitu-
tionality of criminal sentencing guidelines promulgated by a special commission 
the other the validity of user fees promulgated by the Secretary of Transporta~ 
tion. Although the Court rejected those challenges, the cases are significant 
nonetheless because they could encourage the belief that political decisions are 
too important to be left to elected officials. 
The first decision, Mistretta v. United States, 222 upheid the constitutional-
ity of the United States Sentencing Commission, a seven-member body empow-
ered to issue legally binding guidelines that establish maximum and minimum 
sentences for federal crimes.223 Sentencing judges may deviate from the guide-
lines in certain circumstances but must specifically explain such deviations.224 
Failure to comply with the guidelines or adequately to explain deviations from 
them are grounds for appellate reversaJ.225 
In a straightforward application of modern delegation analysis, the Court 
found that Congress had provided "sufficiently specific and detailed" standards 
for the Commission's work. 226 In particular, the legislature had articulated 
three goals and four purposes for the new sentencing system,227 and directed the 
Commission to develop a range of sentences for different categories of offenses 
and various types of offenders according to general criteria prescribed in the 
statute.228 Having done this much, Congress "especially appropriate[ly]" dele-
gated the "intricate, labor-intensive task" of developing proportionate sanctions 
for hundreds of crimes and thousands of offenders "to an expert body."229 
222. 109 S. Ct. 647 ( 1989). 
223. The Commission is located in the judicial branch. (ls members, three of.whom must be article III 
judges, are appointed by the President subject to Senate confirmation; they are subject to presidential removal 
from the Commission only for cause. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (Supp. V 1987). Although the Court devoted most of its 
opinion to the location, composition, and independence of the Commission, see Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 661-75, 
those questions relate only secondarily to the problem of separation of powers conflicts between Congress and the 
President. For that reason, they will receive little direct attention here. For more comprehensive discussions of 
these issues, see Krent, supra note 124, at 1311-16; Pierce, Morrison v. Olson. Separation of Powers, and the 
Structure of Government, 1988 SuP. Cr. REV. I, 35-38; Student Essay, The Constitutionality of the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission: An Analysis of the Role of the Judiciary, 57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 704, 712-30 (1989); Note. 
The Constitutional Infirmities of the United States Sentencing Commission, 96 YALE L.J. 1363, 1376-88 (1987). 
224. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (Supp. V 1987). 
225. !d. § 3742. 
226. Mistretta, I 09 S. Ct. at 655. 
227. !d. at 655-56 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 991(b){l) (Supp. V 1987)). 
228. !d. at 656-57 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 994 (Supp. V 1987)). 
229. /d. at 658. 
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This conclusion should have come as no surprise. Although numerous judi-
cial statements aver that Congress may not delegate the legislative power,230 the 
Court has actually found an unconstitutional delegation only twice.231 More-
over, the cases have used a variety of tests to avoid striking down legislative 
delegations. 232 Since the New Deal, the focus has changed from rhetorical con-
demnation toward a search for standards and procedures to prevent arbitrary 
administration and promote accountability, with particular emphasis upon the 
availability of judicial review. 233 As a practical matter, the delegation doctrine 
is moribund as a device for invalidating federal legislation.234 
Although the lack-of-standards challenge succumbed without difficulty, the 
duties assigned to the Sentencing Commission raised an alternative concern that 
the Court did not address. Congress alone has the power to declare federal 
crimes. 235 Congress alone, therefore, may determine the permissible sentences 
230. Perhaps the classic statement of this position came in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649,692 (1892): "That 
Congress cannot delegate legislative power ... is a principle universally recognized as vital to the integrity and 
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution." 
231. A .L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 ( 1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 
U.S. 388 ( 1935). See also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 ( 1936) (suggesting the unconstitutional-
ity of delegations to private groups); but cf United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577-78 
( 1939) (upholding validity of a delegation to private parties). 
232. Among these have been the "named contingency" test, see Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693 (1892) 
(upholding a statute allowing the President to suspend duty-free importation of goods from any nation that did not 
accord reciprocally fair treatment to U.S. goods); The Brig Aurora, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 383 (1813) {uphold-
ing statute permitting President to lift trade embargoes against England and France when those nations "ceased 
to violate the neutral commerce of the United States"), the "legislative standards" test, see Mahler v. Eby, 264 
U.S. 32,40 (1924) (finding ambiguous statutory standards for deportation of undesirable aliens to derive meaning 
from "common understanding"); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 ( 1911) (upholding preservation 
regulations for national forests, the violation of which was a criminal offense, as an exercise of executive power to 
"fill in the details"); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 496-97 ( 1904) (approving delegation authorizing Sec-
retary of the Treasury to establish uniform standards for importation of tea in circumstances when "named con-
tingency" lest could not have been met), and the "intelligible principle" test, see J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 ( 1928) (upholding delegation to President to adjust tariff rates to equalize 
differences in cost of production of foreign and domestic products). 
233. The leading example of this approach is Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). The Mistretta 
decision relied heavily upon Yak us in its discussion of the delegation issue and quoted at length from the opinion 
in that case as the basis for resolving that issue. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647. 655, 658 (1989). 
234. Perhaps the most striking illustration of this development is Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Connally, 
337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (3-judge court), which upheld a delegation to the President "to issue such orders 
and regulations [implementing wage and price controls] as he deems appropriate," based upon a "common lore" 
of earlier price control regimes and the availability of judicial review of the orders and regulations actually issued. 
The delegation doctrine is not entirely dead, however. The Court occasionally invokes the doctrine as a justifi-
cation for narrov.:ing the scope of seemingly broad statutory delegations. E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. I, 17-18 
(1965); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,583-85 (1963); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116,129-30 (1958); see also 
Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CJO v. American Petroleum Jnst., 448 U.S. 607, 645-46 (1980). In addition, some 
separate opinions have relied upon delegation arguments. E.g., American Textile Mfrs. lost. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 
490. 546-47 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CJO v. American Petroleum lost., 
448 U.S. 607, 685-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 ( 1967) 
(Brennan, J., concurring). 
Finally, in its decision invalidating the legislative veto, the Court distinguished rulemaking performed by 
administrative agencies from congressional action subject to the bicameralism and presentation requirements in 
part on the basis that rulemaking was subject to the delegation doctrine. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,953 n.l6 (1983). Despite the implications of this statement, the cases discussed in the text 
of thiS section demonstrate that the delegation doctrine has not enjoyed a recent revival. 
235. There are no federal common law crimes. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 
(IBI2); see W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW§ 2.1(c), at 66 & n.l7 (2d ed. 1986). 
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for federal crimes, a task which implicates fundamental moral judgments ap-
propriately made only by officials who are directly accountable to the people in 
whose name those judgments are made. 236 The sentencing guidelines, like the 
sequestration process created by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, transferred impor-
tant decisions from elected, politically accountable officials to appointed experts. 
Accordingly, even if the intricacy of the task required the assistance of special-
ists, Congress and the President should have taken the ultimate responsibility 
for fixing allowable sentences for persons convicted of federal crimes by for-
mally adopting the guidelines through the legislative process.237 
This objection to the sentencing guidelines comes close to suggesting that 
determining the acceptable magnitude of criminal sanctions is a nondelegable 
function. As an initial proposition, this argument was unpromising because the 
Court long ago had approved the delegation to an executive department of au-
thority to promulgate regulations the violation of which would give rise to crim-
inal liability.238 In a different setting, however, the Court more recently had 
implied that Congress could not delegate the taxing power. 239 Analogous rea-
soning might have led to the conclusion that the political branches could not 
wholly delegate the responsibility for determining the range of permissible crim-
inal sentences. Last Term's other delegation decision cast doubt upon any such 
implication. 
In Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co.,240 the Court unanimously re-
jected the argument that delegations of the taxing power are subject to more 
stringent requirements than are other delegations. Mid-America Pipeline con-
cerned the constitutionality of a statute directing the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to impose user fees upon pipeline operators to cover the cost of administer-
ing pipeline safety programs. 241 The challenge maintained that the user fees 
were really taxes essentially because, without the fees, the ·safety programs 
would have been supported by taxpayer funds. The Court found nothing in the 
language or structure of article I suggesting special hostility to delegations of 
the taxing power and pointedly remarked that from the First Congress onward 
the legislature has delegated considerable discretion to the executive under the 
tax laws. 242 Because the statute at issue contained ample standards under tradi-
236. See. e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (\980); Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 
(1958); Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916). 
237. Alternatively, the power to promulgate the sentencing guidelines involved a delegation of purely legisla-
tive power. not of the ancillary power to make rules in connection with the exercise of executive or legislative 
power. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 678-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
238. E.g., United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911); see also Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 
1374, 1385-86 ([).D.C.) (3-judge court) (discussing Supreme Court decisions upholding delegation of allegedly 
nondelegable functions). ajfd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
239. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974). 
240. I 09 S. Ct. 1726 ( 1989). 
241. Consolidated Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, § 7005, 49 U.S.C. app. § 1682a (Supp. V 1987). This 
provision directed the Secretary to fix the fees at a level sufficient to cover the costs of administering these pro-
grams but limited their aggregate amount to 5% above the maximum expenditures for that purpose provided in 
the statute. The goal was to make these programs self-financing without providing a windfall for the treasury. See 
Mid-America Pipeline, 109 S. Ct. at 1728-29. 
242. Mid-America Pipeline, 109 S. Ct. at 1732-33. The Court found National Cable Television, see supra 
note 239 and accompanying text, entirely compatible with this analysis. The fees at issue in that case inured in 
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tiona! delegation principles to constrain the Secretary's discretion, it survived 
the constitutional attack. 
In short, these cases continue the Court's consistent rejection of delegation 
challenges. Despite the urging of various commentators,243 the Supreme Court 
has essentially abandoned the delegation doctrine as a meaningful approach to 
separation of powers problems. Judicial reluctance to apply the doctrine does 
not necessarily render the concern over delegation any less genuine. Rather, it 
may reflect the difficulty of fashioning meaningful judicial criteria for applying 
the doctrine to situations involving less "a point of principle [than] a question of 
degree."244 This lesson may have more general application in separation of pow-
ers disputes. 
Ill. CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Perhaps "[i] t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial depart-
ment to say what the law is,"245 but the discussion in Part II suggests that the 
Supreme Court's efforts to define the allocation of power between the legislative 
and executive branches have left the law in an unsatisfactory state. This condi-
tion arises less from the idiosyncrasies or intellectual deficiencies of judges than 
from the intractable nature of the subject.246 No unitary judicial approach to 
this subject can take account of its logical and empirical complexities. Unlike 
individual rights and perhaps also federalism disputes,247 Congress and the 
President possess ample political resources with which to protect their interests. 
For this reason, and because the legislature and the chief executive also have 
the practical wisdom to determine for themselves the stakes of any particular 
controversy, courts should hesitate to insist upon comprehensive resolution of 
constitutional turf battles between the political branches. More important, the 
political branches themselves and the citizenry at large should hesitate to seek 
judicial resolution of these issues. 
The following sections first explore various unsuccessful efforts to reconcile 
the recent separation of powers jurisprudence, next suggest that less enthusiasm 
for judicial resolution of these disputes might have encouraged more meaningful 
dialogue between Congress and the President, and finally urge that the focus 
upon the constitutional issues at stake in these cases tended to obscure more 
mundane, but also more significant, objections to the wisdom of the governmen-
part to the benefit or the public, but the statute under which they were imposed did not clearly enough indicate 
congressional intent to authorize recovery [rom regulated parties o[ the cost o[ benefits conferred upon society at 
large. In Mid-America Pipeline, by contrast, the statute reflected an intention to make the pipeline safety pro-
grams self-financing. Mid-America Pipeline, I 09 S. Ct. at 1733-34. 
243. E.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1980); T. LOW!, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-126, 
300-0I (2d ed. 1979); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 146; Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: 
Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223 (I 985). 
244. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 677 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Stewart, The 
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1693-97 (1975). 
245. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), quoted in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 
683, 703, 705 ( 1974). 
246. See Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, !986 DUKE L.J. I, 27-28; Easterbrook, 
Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 805-07 ( 1982). 
· 247. See supra note 24. 
210 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:175 
tal policies in question. Accepting the premises of this discussion would not as-
sure more intelligent public policies, but it would increase the likelihood that 
such policies would emerge. 
A. The Difficulty of Reconciling the Cases 
The recent Supreme Court decisions addressing separation of powers dis-
putes between the legislative and executive branches have employed distinctive 
analytical techniques. At times, the Court has applied a strictly formal ap-
proach emphasizing the essential separateness of the branches and underscoring 
the importance of allowing each to function as master in its own sphere. At 
others, the Court has followed a more pragmatic course focusing upon the exis-
tence of checks and balances to prevent the accumulation of unopposed author-
ity that could lead to arbitrary action by a single branch. The analytical scheme 
selected has determined the outcome of virtually every case discussed in Part II, 
including all of those during the 1980s. The Chadha and Bowsher rulings fall 
into the former group, while Morrison, Mistretta, and Mid-America Pipeline 
fall into the latter.248 
The difficulty arises less from the existence of parallel lines of cases than 
from the Court's almost complete failure even to acknowledge its contrasting 
methodologies in separation of powers disputes. 249 This phenomenon was most 
pronounced in Bowsher, which reached its conclusion through rigidly formal 
reasoning without so much as citing Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
v. Schor,250 a decision announced the same day which used a much more flexi-
ble approach in rejecting a separation of powers challenge to the assignment of 
adjudicatory powers to an agency whose members lacked the salary and tenure 
protections of article Ill judges.251 The opinion in Schor attempted to distin-
guish Bowsher on the basis that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, but not the CFTC's 
organic statute, involved a congressional attempt to aggrandize power at the 
expense of another branch. 252 That theme was reiterated in Morrison and Mis-
248. The sole exception to this pattern was Buckley, in which the Court endorsed a relatively pragmatic 
approach to separation of powers problems but found that the method for selecting members of the Federal 
Election Commission violated the express terms of the appointments clause. See supra notes 97-106 and accompa-
nying text. 
249. Judicial acknowledgments of analytical inconsistencies in recent separation of powers jurisprudence ap-
pear primarily in dissenting opinions. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2637 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 865 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Commenta-
tors who take different positions on the proper method for resolving separation of powers disputes express equal 
dissatisfaction with the Court's failure to address the analytical inconsistencies in its jurisprudence in this field. 
See, e.g., Carter, supra note 199, at 110, 113, 116-17 (advocating a relatively formal approach to separation of 
powers problems); Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a Principle: A Comment on the Burger Court's Jurispru-
de/Ice in Separation of Powers Cases, 60S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, !084-85, 1097-101 ( 1987) (advocating a relatively 
pragmatic approach to separation of powers problems). 
250. 478 u.s. 833 (1986). 
251. See supra note 2. An only somewhat less egregious example occurred in Misrretra, where the Court 
claimed consistently to have followed a "flexible understanding of separation of powers." Mistretta v. United 
States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 659 (1989). That understanding was said to emphasize the danger of interbranch aggran-
dizement. See id. at 658-61. 
252. Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57. 
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tretta. 253 Yet none of these opinions attempted to explain how or why the Court 
chose which methodology in any particular case. 
Beyond this substantial problem, the aggrandizement-nonaggrandizement 
distinction is difficult to apply coherently. Any measure that reallocates author-
ity from one branch to another can be said both to increase the power of the 
branch which gains new authority and to diminish the power of the branch 
which loses authority that it previously possessed.254 All of the cases considered 
here involved statutes of this type. For example, in Schor, an administrative 
agency was given authority to decide certain common law claims that otherwise 
would have been resolved by the courts, thus diminishing the power of the judi-
ciary. In Bowsher, an official supposedly subservient to Congress was given au-
thority to perform executive functions that otherwise would have been under-
taken or directed by the President. Thus, even if Congress did not expressly 
usurp judicial power in Schor,m it left the judiciary with a smaller proportion 
of federal power than that branch otherwise would have had. By the same to-
ken, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings contained a procedure for avoiding sequestra-
tion under which Congress, by passing a deficit-reduction measure over a presi-
dential veto, could act unilaterally. Hence, even if one accepts the dubious 
assumption that the procedure for removing the Comptroller General rendered 
that official subservient to the legislative branch, the extent of congressional 
aggrandizement might well have been substantially less in Bowsher than in 
Schor. Nevertheless, the arrangement in Bowsher was invalidated while that in 
Schor was upheld. The arrangements approved in Mid-America Pipeline, Mis-
tretta, and Morrison also involved reallocations of authority comparable to that 
rejected in Bowsher. 256 
The infirmities of the Court's approach have prompted several commenta-
tors to propose alternative reconciliations of these cases. Academic formalists 
have suggested that the cases turn on considerations of the constitutional limita-
tions upon how each branch may act. 257 Those adhering to a more functionalist 
perspective have tried to harmonize the cases with reference to a more holistic 
focus upon the quality and extent of interbranch relationships that vindicate 
253. See Misrrwa, I 09 S. Ct. at 660; Morrison, I 08 S. Ct. at 2620. 
254. See Blumoff, supra note 173, at 1150-51; Krent, supra note 124, at 1288-89; Strauss, supra note 10, at 
517. Professor Krent attempts to demonstrate the point algebraically. Krent, supra note 124, at 1288 n.l41. 
255. In one sense, Congress did arrogate power to itself by conferring the adjudicatory authority in question 
upon the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The CFTC is an "independent agency.'' Schor, 478 U.S. at 
836. Members of the legislative branch often regard independent agencies as creatures of Congress. See Miller, 
supra note 165, at 63-64. From this perspective, Schor might indeed involve an attempt at congressional aggran-
dizement of authority at the expense of another branch. 
256. The analogous reasoning concerning the cases discussed in the text proceeds as follows. In Mid-America 
Pipeline, the executive branch gained the power to impose user fees that otherwise would have rested with Con-
gress. In Misrrerra, the judicial branch received the power to determine the permissible range of criminal 
sentences, authority that otherwise belonged to Congress. In Morrison, the judicial branch obtained authority over 
law enforcement that otherwise would have been exercised by the executive. Even if one characterized the ar-
rangements in the first two cases as congressional giveaways rather than executive or judicial usurpations, the 
mterbranch balance of power changed as a result of these arrangements. The provision in Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
hngs authorizing Congress alone to prevent sequestration from occurring makes it difficult to maintain that the 
magnitude of the reallocation of power in Bowsher exceeded that in any of the cases discussed in this footnote. 
257. E.g., Krent, supra note 124, at 1256-58, 1273-98. 
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underlying structural principles of the Constitution. 258 These theories are based 
upon considerable intellectual acumen and reflect impressive powers of synthe-
sis. Unfortunately, they are also problematic. For example, some of these theo-
ries do not in fact account for the outcome of all of the recent separation of 
powers decisions. 259 Moreover, formalism, as Bowsher demonstrates, can attach 
enormous legal weight to factors that have little actual significance. By contrast 
functionalism can yield such divergent conclusions that even its adherents cau~ 
tion against the possibility of "conscious or unconscious manipulation. " 260 Thus 
this approach may be "more effective as a means of organizing debate than as ~ 
rule for deciding cases. " 261 These difficulties underscore the intractable com-
plexity of the subject. 
The unsatisfactory judicial performance and the inadequacies of existing 
theories also suggest that Dean Choper might have had a more valuable insight 
than he has received credit for when he urged the Supreme Court to refrain 
from deciding separation of powers disputes between Congress and the Presi-
dent; such disputes would be resolved through bargaining and accommi'Gation 
between the political branches. 262 To the extent that his proposal rests upon the 
notion that judicial decisions in this field squander limited institutional capital 
that should be saved for more urgent individual rights cases, it has received 
justifiable criticism."63 On the other hand, this proposal has the virtue of forcing 
us to confront the limitations as well as the benefits of judicial review in a field 
where principled decisions are difficult to construct and so basic a question as 
the proper method of analysis remains unpredictable. 
The suggestion of judicial abstention in separation of powers disputes has 
elicited concerns that one branch might use its short-term bargaining advantage 
to effect permanent and deleterious changes in the relati';e allocation of pow-
ers.26"1 These concerns are legitimate but they should not be exaggerated. As 
noted in the introduction to this Article, the judiciary has played no role or only 
258. E.g., Strauss, supra note 10, at 517-21; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 495-96. 
259. Professor Krent, a formalist, and Professor Pierce, a functionalist. both found the Sentencing Commis-
sion unconstitutional under their theories. Krent, supra note 124, at 1311-16; Pierce, supra note 223, at 36. The 
Court, on the other hand. upheld the validity of the Sentencing Commission in Mistretta. See supra notes 222-37 
and accompanying text. Professor Pierce sought to avoid the implications of his theory by treating the placement 
of the Commission in the judicial branch as a slip of the legislative pen. Pierce, supra note 223, at 37. 
260. Strauss, supra note 23, at 617. A critic of this approach charges that functionalism serves as "a shield 
behind which courts could rationalize their decisions to restructure governmental arrangements, but it does not 
provide them with useful criteria as to when and in what circumstances that restructuring is needed." Gilford, 
supra note 165, at 479. 
The indeterminacy of functionalism is illustrated by the Bowsher case. Justice White demonstrated in detail 
that the procedure for removing the Comptroller General, which served as the centerpiece of the Court's opinion, 
posed no real threat of congressional usurpation of executive authority. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 770-75 
( 1986) (White, J., dissenting). Professor Strauss, in turn, criticized Justice White's analysis for failing to look 
beyond the removal procedure to "the general framework of relationships among the GAO, Congress, President, 
and courts." Strauss, supra note I 0, at 520; see id. at 498-99, 519-21. 
261. Strauss, supra note 23, at 625 (footnote omitted). 
262. J. CHOPER, supra note 22. at 263; see id. at 260-379. 
263. !d. at 131-40, 156-70. Dean Choper offered no persuasive evidence that public reaction to rulings up-
holding individual liberties has been affected in any way by the results in separation of powers cases. See Merritt, 
supra note 2, at 17 n.l 0 I (collecting criticisms of this aspect of Choper's reasoning). 
264. See, e.g., Gilford, supra note 165, at 447-48; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 494-95. 
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a marginal one in many important conflicts between Congress and the Presi-
dent, including those involving the Tenure of Office Act, the War Powers Reso-
lution, and Watergate. 
These considerations do not necessarily establish the cogency of Dean 
Choper's proposal. The original structure of the Federal Election Commission, 
which was invalidated in Buckley for violating the appointments clause, shows 
that Congress and the President, left to their own devices, might agree to ar-
rangements that contradict the allocation of authority expressly provided in the 
text of the Constitution. 265 That prospect suggests the need for some judicial 
role in separation of powers disputes. The experiences with the Tenure of Office 
Act, the War Powers Resolution, and Watergate should remind us, however, 
that the political branches have their own resources and responsibilities in this 
field. That in turn counsels against excessive reliance upon the judiciary as the 
ultimate arbiter of legislative-executive controversies. The Supreme Court itself 
recently cautioned against gratuitous judicial resolution of such a constitutional 
turf battle.266 The next two sections examine the reasons for this caution. 
B. The Political Branches and Separation of Powers Disputes 
Enthusiasts of judicial resolution of separation of powers disputes between 
the political branches reason from two essential premises. One is that the politi-
cal branches are unqualified to interpret the Constitution. The other is that in-
terbranch differences pose unacceptable risks to the quality of public policy. 
Both of these premises are misleading at besl. 
The assumption that only the judiciary can resolve constitutional disputes 
between Congress and the President has at least two unfortunate consequences. 
First, elected officials might refrain from evaluating the constitutionality of 
practices or proposals that come before them for consideration. Second, legisla-
tors and chief executives might seek to disguise their opposition to the wisdom 
of such practices or proposals by structuring them so as to leave them vulnera-
ble to lawsuits challenging their constitutionality. These avoidance and camou-
flage techniques might insulate politicians from the discomfort associated with 
making hard choices, but they also debase the quality of deliberation about 
public policy. 
These are not purely hypothetical concerns, as situations discussed in Part 
II of this Article attest. As to the first, several members of the House Judiciary 
Committee voted against the article charging President Nixon with committing 
impeachable offenses by defying congressional subpoenas on the ground that 
only the courts could determine the validity of the subpoenas.267 As to the sec-
. 265. See also Olympic Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, No. 90-0482(RCL), 
shpop. at 30 n.9 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 1990) ("The President and the Congress, whether alone or together, cannot 
decJde to circumvent the [appointments clause's requirements."). 
. 
266. American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 109 S. Ct. 1693, 1698 (1989). For discussion of the substan-
tive questions at issue in that case, see Quint, Reflections on the Separation of Powers and Judicial Review at the 
End of the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. \liASH. L. REV. 427, 451-55 (1989). 
. 
26:· H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 360-61, 485-87 (1974) (minority views); id. at 504-05 (addi-
~nal VJcws of Mr. Railsback): id. at 507-08 (additional views of Mr. Dennis); id. at 520-23 (additional views of 
r. Froehlich in opposition to article III); DEBATE oN ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT: HEARINGS BEFORE THE 
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ond, the Democratic leadership of the House of Representatives, which opposed 
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, supported specific provisions that they be-
lieved would make a constitutional challenge to the statute more likely to 
succeed.268 
The abhorrence of interbranch conflict also reflects a very different view of 
the process of government than the one embodied in the structure of the Consti-
tution. The framers constructed an elaborate set of checks and balances to 
structure the relationship between the political branches. Adherence to these 
ground rules was expected to prevent overreaching by one branch and to dis-
courage the enactment of unsound proposals. Excessive reliance upon the judici-
ary to resolve legislative-executive turf battles threatens to undermine the bene-
fits of this scheme. This prospect should be troublesome to all citizens 
regardless of their general views about originalism in constitutional 
interpretation. 
1. Constitutional Interpretation by the Political Branches 
As noted at the outset of this Part, the Supreme Court determined at an 
early date that the judicial branch has the duty "to say what the law is."26a 
This statement has served as the predicate for the view that the Court has ulti-
mate, if not exclusive, authority in constitutional interpretation.27° For this rea-
son, many observers regard with trepidation any suggestion to treat separation 
of powers disputes between Congress and the President as nonjusticiable. Yet 
the status of the Supreme Court as sole expositor of the Constitution has not 
been universally accepted. 
For example, Andrew Jackson refused to regard the ruling in McCulloch v. 
M aryland271 as having settled the constitutionality of the Bank of the United 
States. In vetoing a bill to recharter the Bank, Jackson wrote: 
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own 
opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Con-
stitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood 
by others .... The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted 
to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but 
to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning may deserve. 272 
HousE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 455-56 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Froehlich); id. at 469-70 
(remarks of Rep. Smith); id. at 473, 474 (remarks of Rep. Railsback). For criticism of excessive reliance upon the 
judiciary for resolution of this matter, see J. CHOPER, supra note 22, at 307-08; Gunther, supra note 21, at 35-39. 
268. See Ellwood, supra note 150, at 564. 
269. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see supra text accompanying note 245. 
270. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,549 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. I, 18 (1958). This is 
not the only possible interpretation of the language from Marbury, however. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 21, at 
34; Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. I, 20. 
271. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
272. 2 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, at 576, 582 (J. 
Richardson ed. 1896). 
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Abraham Lincoln made his opposition to the Dred Scott decision273 an im-
portant part .of his unsuccessful campaign for the Senate in 1858.274 He later 
broadened his attack on the "judicial monopoly" theory of constitutional inter-
pretation.275 In his first inaugural address, Lincoln explained: 
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to 
be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding 
in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while they are also 
entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all other depart-
ments of the Government. ... At the same time, the candid citizen must confess that 
if the policy of the Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be 
irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in 
ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to 
be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their Government into 
the hands of that eminent tribunal.276 
Similar views were expressed both before and after these statements. Thus, 
Thomas Jefferson pardoned those convicted under the Sedition Act of 1798277 
despite judicial rulings upholding the constitutionality of the statute.278 More 
recently, President Franklin D. Roosevelt vigorously attacked Supreme Court 
rulings invalidating important aspects of his legislative agenda.279 During the 
Watergate investigation, President Nixon implied that he might disregard a Su-
preme Court directive to comply with the special prosecutor's subpoena unless 
that ruling was "definitive."28° Finally, former Attorney General Edwin Meese 
kindled fierce debate with a speech asserting that "constitutional interpretation 
273. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
274. For example, during the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, Lincoln accepted the Dred Scott decision as conclu-
sive of the rights of the parties to that case but explained that he would "refus[ej to obey it as a political rule. If I 
were in Congress, and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new terri-
tory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision, I would vote that it should." 2 THE COLLECTED WoRKS OF ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 495 (R. Basler ed. 1953). In a subsequent debate, Lincoln added that he opposed Dred Score "as a 
political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding 
on the members of Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with the principles 
of that decision." 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra, at 255. 
275. This term is used in Mulhern, supra note 23, at 100 & n.5 (citing D. MORGAN. CONGRESS AND THE 
CoNSTITUTION 89-96 ( 1966)). 
276. 6 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF TilE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897, supra note 272, at 5, 
9. 
277. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). 
278. As Jefferson explained in 1804 in a letter to Abigail Adams, whose husband he had defeated in the 
presidential election of 1800 in large measure due to popular revulsion against the Sedition Act: 
[N]othing in the Constitution has given [the judges) a right to decide for the executive, more than to the 
executive to decide for them. Both magistracies are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to 
them .... [The Constitution! meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on each other. But the 
opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what are not, not 
only for themselves in their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature and executive also, in their 
spheres, would make the judiciary a despotic branch. 
4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 560, 561 (H. Washington ed. 1857). 
279. See G. GUNTHER, CoNSTITUTION~L LAW 24 (lith ed. 1985). The judicial hostility to Roosevelt's pro-
gram led to the ill-fated Court-packing plan. See L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 209-15 (1988); 
Leuchtenburg, The Case of the Contentious Commissioner: Humphreys' [sic] Executor v. U.S., in FREEDOM AND 
REFORM 276, 310-11 (H. Hyman & L. Levy eds. 1967). 
280. E. DREw, supra note 80, at 5, 45, 283, 304-05, 328. One of President Nixon's advisors was widely 
quoted as saying: "We're leading ourselves into believing the Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of all disputes, 
and 1 don't believe it. I think there are times when the President of the United States would be right in not 
obeying a decision of the Supreme Court." Id. at 21. 
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is not the business of the Court only, but also properly the business of all 
branches of government. " 281 
Even if one rejects the nonjusticiability approach and supports highly def-
erential judicial review in separation of powers disputes between Congress and 
the President, other powerful considerations support an independent role for the 
political branches in constitutional interpretation. At the most basic level 
elected officials must take an oath to uphold the Constitution.282 Faithfulness t~ 
their oath necessarily requires members of Congress and the President to con-
sider the constitutionality of proposed policies as an important aspect of per-
forming their duties. 283 
Beyond the implications of the oath requirement, the Constitution imposes 
affirmative obligations upon elected officials. Several provisions specifically pro-
scribe certain kinds of legislation,284 and a number expressly authorize the pas-
sage of implementing statutes. 285 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself has held 
that Congress is not strictly bound by judicial interpretations of equal protec-
tion in enforcing the fourteenth amendment through legislation.286 Accordingly, 
the political branches cannot escape the necessity of assessing the constitution-
ality of at least some policy proposals. 
In addition, the judiciary cannot resolve every constitutional issue. First, 
article III restricts the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases and controver-
sies.287 Hence, the judicial branch cannot provide advisory opinions to Congress 
or the President on the constitutionality of a proposed bill or program. 288 Sec-
281. Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TVL. L. REv. 979, 985 (1987). For a compilation of popular 
and academic responses to this speech, see Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decisions, 61 
TVL. L. REV. 977-1095 (1987). 
In an earlier and less publicized episode, Mr. Meese suggested that the executive branch might not deem 
itself bound by an adverse judicial ruling in a separation of powers dispute. Ameron, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889-90 (3d Cir.), on reh'g, 809 F.2d 979,991-92 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 109 S. 
Ct. 297 (1988); see Waas & Toobin, Meese's Power Grab, NEW REPUBLIC, May 19, 1986, at 15. 
282. The presidential oath is prescribed in U.S. CaNsT. art. II, § I, cl. 7. The requirement that members of 
Congress (as well as federal judges and all state officials) pledge to "support this Constitution" appears in id. art. 
VI, cl. 3. 
283. L. FtSHER, supra note 279, at 233-34; Bessette & Tulis, supra note 65, at 11; Brest, The Conscientious 
Legislator's Guide to Constitutional /merpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585, 587 (1975); Ross, Legislative Enforce-
ment of Equal Protection, 72 MINN. L. REV. 311, 313-14 (1987). 
284. E.g., U.S. CaNST. art. !, § 9 (prohibiting, inter alia, bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, expenditures 
not authorized by a duly enacted appropriations statute, and titles of nobility; and limiting the grounds for sus-
pending habeas corpus); id. amend. l (prohibiting laws that establish religion or abridge freedom of religion, 
speech, press, and assembly); id. amend. V (prohibiting, inter alia, double jeopardy; self-incrimination; deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property without due process; and uncompensated takings of private property}. 
285. E.g., id. amend. XIJI, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX, § 2; id. amend. 
XXII!, § 2; id. amend. XXIV, § 2; id. amend. XXVI, § 2. 
286. The leading case is Katzen bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 ( 1966). For discussion of the role of the 
legislative branch in interpreting the fourteenth amendment, see L. TRIBE, supra note 206, § 5-14, at 334-50; 
Burt, Miranda and Title /1: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SuP. CT. REv. 81; Cohen, Congressio11al Power to 
Interpret Due Process and Equal Prorection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 { 1975); Ross, supra note 283. 
287. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. 
288. Some state courts do have the authority to issue advisory opinions. A prominent example is Massachu-
setts. where Governor Michael Dukakis's decision to veto a mandatory flag-salute law in response to the advice of 
his state's highest court, Opinions of the Justices to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 363 N.E.2d 251 ( 1977), became 
an unusually salient issue in the 1988 presidential campaign. See generally J. GERMOND & J. WtTCOVER, WHOSE 
BROAD STRIPES AND BRIGHT STARS' 7-8, 160, 359, 460 (1989); Drew, Letter _from Washington, NEW YORKER, 
Oct. 10, 1988, at 96, 96-97. 
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ond, only those with standing to sue may challenge the constitutionality of gov-
ernment policies. If too many persons are affected by a particular policy, no 
private party will have standing to litigate a generalized grievance.289 Even if 
that obstacle is surmounted, other barriers to standing might well prevent the 
litigation of an appreciable number of separation of powers disputes.290 Third, 
the Court has various devices to avoid deciding the merits of cases over which it 
does have jurisdiction. 291 In each of these situations, the absence of judicial res-
olution of the merits effectively requires members of Congress and the President 
to determine the constitutionality of governmental activities for themselves. 
Finally, as a practical matter, Congress and the President already interpret 
the Constitution. That document fixes important political understandings that 
289. See. e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974). 
The standing of members of Congress to litigate the validity of governmental activities remains unsettled. The 
Supreme Court expressly declined to address that issue in Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986), and 
avoided the merits in a subsequent case in which the question was squarely presented, Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 
361 ( 1987). Most of the jurisprudence on this question has arisen in the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit, which has recognized congressional standing in some cases. See, e.g., Barnes v. 
Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy 
v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The concept of congressional standing has been controversial even in 
that court. See, e.g., Barnes, 759 F.2d at 43-56 (Bark, J., dissenting); Moore v. United States House of Represent-
atives, 733 F.2d 946, 957-61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985). 
At the same time, the D.C. Circuit has limited congressional access to judicial relief under a doctrine known 
as "equitable discretion," which results in the dismissal of some cases in which the congressional plaintiff is found 
to have standing and where no other devices for avoiding the merits are available. See, e.g., Melcher v. Federal 
Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2034 ( 1988); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 
699 F.2d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 656 
F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981); see generally McGowan, Congressmen in Court: Tlze 
New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 241 (1981) (proposing equitable discretion doctrine as an avoidance device). This 
doctrine also has drawn withering criticism, see Barnes, 759 F.2d at 59-61 (Bark, J., dissenting); Moore, 733 F.2d 
at 961-64 (Scalia, J., concurring), and some members of the court who previously had applied the doctrine have 
expressed serious misgivings about it, see Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Humphrey v. Brady, 109 S. Ct. 491 (1988); Melcher, 836 F.2d at 565 n.4; id. at 565 (Edwards, J., concur-
ring). For a comprehensive discussion, see Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss Congressional-Plaintiff Suits: A 
Reassessment, 40 CASE W. RES. l. REV. __ (1990). 
290. In order to establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-prong test of injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. The jurisprudence of 
standing has been notably erratic, but recent decisions have adopted a markedly restrictive approach. See, e.g., 
Allen, 468 U.S. 737; City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights 
Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). The commentary on this subject is voluminous. 
See, e.g., Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 
93 HARV. L. REv. 297 (1979); Nichol, Injury and the Disintegration of Article III, 74 CALIF. L. REv. 1915 
(l986); Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432 (1988); Tushnet, The 
Sociology of Article JII: A Response to Professor Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698 (1980). 
291. Among these avoidance techniques are the political question and ripeness doctrines. The former holds 
that the issue in dispute is inappropriate for judicial resolution at any time, whereas the latter views the contro-
versy as prematurely presented to the courts. 
The political question doctrine has been distinctly out of favor with the Supreme Court in recent decades. 
See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 121-27 (1986); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 940-43 (1983); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,692-97 (1974); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 
486.518-49 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). But see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002-
06 (l979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, 10-11 (1973). Lower 
courts have made greater use of the doctrine during this period. See Mulhern, supra note 23, at I 06-08 nn.25-31 
(collecting cases). 
The leading case on ripeness is Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See generally Nichol, Ripe-
ness and the Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (1987). 
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typically go unremarked because of their broad acceptance. For example, no 
controversy exists over the eligibility standards or the duration of terms for fed-
eral elected officials. Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan did not 
seek third terms because all concerned understood that the twenty-second 
amendment precluded them from doing so; Edward Kennedy did not seek his 
brother John's Senate seat in 1961 because article I made clear that a twenty-
nine-year-old, no matter how prominent or well connected, could not hold the 
position. Similarly, despite the controversy over the legislative veto, no one ques-
tions that bills must satisfy the bicameralism and presentation requirements to 
become laws, or that the Senate must confirm ambas~adors, federal judges, and 
other officers of the United States.292 Indeed, during Watergate members of 
Congress from both parties believed that President Nixon's defiance of a Su-
preme Court ruling in the litigation over the White House tape recordings 
would both justify and assure his impeachment and removal from office, a con-
clusion for which no judicial precedent existed.293 Thus, the question is not 
whether the political branches will interpret the Constitution but under what 
circumstances they will do so. 
2. The Benefits of Interbranch Constitutional Debate 
The preceding discussion demonstrated that legislative and executive evalu-
ation of the constitutional issues raised in separation of powers disputes between 
Congress and the President is appropriate. This section further suggests that 
such consideration is desirable. To be sure, independent constitutional interpre-
tation by nonjudicial officials holds out the prospect of disagreement between 
the political branches on fundamental issues. Although many modern commen-
tators view interbranch conflict with distaste,294 the Constitution was designed 
to facilitate debate among elected officials on important public questions. This 
debate might lead to stalemate, but it also could stimulate more thoughtful pub-
lic policy. This prospect suggests that Congress and the President should be 
discouraged from relying too much upon the judiciary as arbiter of separation 
of powers disputes and encouraged to reach workable accommodations that do 
not contravene the constitutional text. 
As noted earlier, the Constitution recognized the possibility that one 
branch would seek to encroach upon the power of another, thereby jeopardizing 
the core value of freedom upon which the new government rested.295 To mini-
mize this possibility, each branch was given sufficient power and incentives to 
resist attempted usurpations. Because the framers feared legislative aggrandize-
ment,296 they made Congress bicameral and gave the President a qualified veto. 
292. See Bessette & Tulis, supra note 65, at 9-10; Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 399,414 (1985). 
The only exception to the statement in text concerns the President's power to make recess appointments when the 
Senate is not in session. See U.S. CaNST. art. ll, § 2, cl. 3. 
293. See E. DREW, supra note 80, at 41, 43, 51, 283, 292; Bessette & Tulis, supra note 65, at 9. 
294. N. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 202 (4th ed. 1986). Professor Polsby is not one of those 
commentalors. See id. 
295. See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text. 
296. Perhaps the most famous expression of this concern is Madison's observation that "[i]n republican gov-
ernment, the legislative authority necessarily predominates." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 68, at 322. 
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At the same time, the unfortunate experience under the British made all con-
cerned acutely aware of the dangers of unchecked executive power, which was 
"carefully limited" in article IJ.297 Significantly, however, the Constitution did 
not explicitly define the respective powers of each branch, and its supporters 
discounted the value of "parchment barriers" against overreaching.298 Despite 
the availability of judicial review,299 Congress and the President were expected 
to rely primarily upon their own political self-defense mechanisms when inter-
branch disputes arose. 
In short, the framers did not contemplate an active judicial role in separa-
tion of powers disputes. This crude originalism cannot end the discussion, how-
ever. After all, the framers also created a system of limited government. Be-
cause the Constitution embodied liberty as one of its core values, a faithful 
adherent to the founding design might argue that the courts should police the 
vision of the framers by rigorously enforcing the separation of powers. This ar-
gument takes on added force in light of the vastly increased scale of federal 
activities compared with the role of the central government envisioned in the 
last decades of the eighteenth century. 
Two responses to this claim are available. First, the Supreme Court in re-
cent years has tried to give effect to the founding design. As Part II sought to 
demonstrate, the results of this enterprise have been unsatisfactory. An original-
ist might rejoin that these difficulties have arisen from the Court's failure to 
apply a strict separation principle with sufficient consistency. That point leads 
directly into the second response to the originalist position: The framers lacked 
a detailed vision of the institutional implications of the separation of powers 
doctrine and did not contemplate a regime of rigid formality in this field. 300 The 
absence of such a vision might help to explain the difficulties of the recent judi-
cial opinions on this subject. Because the Constitution does not yield conclusive 
answers to these questions and because Congress and the President have both 
the resources and the incentive to defend their positions, disputes of this kind 
are appropriately addressed primarily in the political arena, with judicial re-
course serving only as a last resort. 
At bottom, these disputes involve questions about the role of government in 
American life. In general, those who advocate strict maintenance of interbranch 
boundaries believe in a comparatively limited federal role. Although the Su-
preme Court has dealt with the subject only obliquely,301 several commentators 
Madison also complained that ''[t]he legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and 
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961). 
297. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 296, at 309. See also D. EPSTEIN, supra note 69, at 132. 
298. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 296, at 308-09. 
• 
299. The question of the legitimacy and proper scope of judicial review is beyond the scope of this Article. 
See supra note 24. Suffice it to say that supporters of the Constitution argued that the courts would have the 
power to invalidate legislation. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466-69 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
300
· W. GWYN, supra note 46, at 128; Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and 
Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 211, 212, 224, 239-42, 260-61 (1989); Shane, supra note 209, at 616-17. 
30 1. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (separation of powers "provide[s] avenues for the 
0'eratl0n of checks on the exercise of governmental power"); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 
.S. 919, 959 (1983) (separation of powers operates to "define and limit the exercise of ... federal powers"). 
:;t 
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have recognized the political implications of these conflicts. Rigid demarcation 
between the executive and legislative branches, according to this view, would 
make it more difficult for the federal government to act. A strong delegation 
doctrine would force Congress to make hard policy choices about contentious 
subjects; the more specific the statute must be, the greater the possibility that 
opponents could defeat it. The absence of the legislative veto would discourage 
Congress from authorizing agencies to promulgate regulations that could be 
overturned only through the regular legislative process with all its complexities 
and pitfalls. And giving the President unfettered removal authority and absolute 
control over all officials exercising executive power would make Congress less 
willing to permit agencies from which the legislature would be effectively insu-
lated. 302 The political compromises leading to the creation of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Federal Trade Commisssion suggest that this 
view is not entirely implausible.303 
Whether or not rigorous adherence to separation of powers principles 
would reduce the federal role,304 powerful legal arguments exist for a more flex-
ible constitutional analysis in this field. Among them are the flexibility inherent 
in a Constitution which does not rigidly define the authority of the legislative 
and executive branches, the apparent pragmatism of the framers in addressing 
problems of administration, the wide (though not unlimited) latitude afforded to 
Congress under the "necessary and proper" clause to structure the government, 
and the twentieth-century breakdown of whatever earlier consensus had existed 
in favor of strictly limited government.305 Moreover, wide public support re-
mains for an enlarged federal role, as the difficulty of reducing the budget defi-
302. See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 16-17 (1985); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 146, at 63-64; 
Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 153, 156 {1987); Gellhorn, Returning to First 
Principles, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 345, 349 ( 1987). 
303. See R. CuSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 177-87 (1941) (ICC); S. 
SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE 138-50 (1982) (ITC). 
304. It is difficult to assess the accuracy of this hypothesis. In Chadha, the Supreme Court held that statutes 
containing unconstitutional legislative vetoes could remain in force if the objectionable veto provisions were severa-
ble. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-32. The Court endorsed a severability criterion that would uphold a partially uncon-
stitutional statute "[ujnless it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are 
within its power, independently of that which is not." Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 
234 ( 1932). 
Applying that standard reveals the difficulty of predicting what Congress would do under a stricter separation 
of powers regime. The Chadha majority found the legislative veto provision severable from the remainder of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932-35. Justice Rehnquist, after examining the identical 
historical record, found that it was not. /d. at 1013-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Similarly, the Court summarily 
affirmed a finding of severability in one of Chadha's companion cases despite strong indications that the measure 
in question would not have been enacted without the veto. See Consumer Energy Council v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 
440-45 (D.C. Cir. 1982), affd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 
U.S. 1216 (1983). The evidence to the contrary included protracted congressional consideration of the statute, 
which passed the House by only one vote after its proponents emphasized the availability of legislative vetoes of 
objectionable agency rules. See Miller, supra note I 65, at 89 n.l75; Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of 
Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 427, 447 (I 989). 
305. Perhaps the leading academic advocates of this perspective have been Professors Strauss and Sunstein. 
See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 23; Sunstein, supra note 3. On the "necessary and proper" clause, see Van Alstyne, 
The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment 
on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1976, at 102. 
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cit during the 1980s attests.306 In these circumstances, a sustained effort to in-
validate government programs on separation of powers grounds could threaten a 
political crisis comparable to the one that arose from the Supreme Court's over-
turning many of the early New Deal reforms. 307 
The optimum solution to this conflict is for partisans of the competing ap-
proaches to argue over their political disagreements in political settings. This 
solution has several advantages over reliance upon the courts. First, the difficul-
ties of producing consistent, principled answers to these problems suggest that 
the concept of separation of powers provides less a rule of decision than a heu-
ristic concept for structuring analysis. 308 
Second, interbranch negotiation rather than judicial determination ac-
knowledges the political contingencies involved in many separation of powers 
disputes. As noted above, supporters of a strong doctrine in this field tradition-
ally have also endorsed limited government. For that reason, advocates of a 
more activist state generally have denigrated the separation principle as an 
anachronism at best and an obstacle to essential reforms at worst.309 This pat-
tern has not always existed, however. For example, in the 1970s the principal 
exponents of legislative authority as a means of recapturing the proper inter-
branch allocation of power supported a greater federal role; the defenders of 
expansive presidential prerogatives favored a smaller central government. 310 
Moreover, the leading separation of powers cases in recent years have been ad-
vanced not by advocates of smaller government but by champions of a more 
aggessive federal role. The challenges to the constitutionality of the legislative 
veto in Chadha, the deficit-reduction mechanism of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
in Bowsher, and the Sentencing Commission in Mistretta were brought by ad-
vocates of more vigorous government regulation. These exponents of a more 
activist state believe that strict adherence to separation of powers principles will 
reduce the influence of industry, trade, and other economic special interests and 
thereby facilitate the development and implementation of effective programs to 
306. See R. EISNER. How REAL Is THE fEDERAL DEFICIT? 160-61 (1986); D. STOCKMAN, THE TRIUMPH OF 
POLITICS 8-9, 376-77, 390-92 (1986). 
307. Political prediction is a notoriously risky affair. Nevertheless, the intense opposition to the failed Su-
preme Court nomination of Robert Bark, which reflected concern over the threat of significant changes in consti-
tutional law, suggests that a separalion of powers jurisprudence that invalidated many environmental, health, and 
safety programs would stimulate widespread controversy. Even Professor Epstein, a leading academic exponent of 
limited government, recognizes the difficulty of wholesale judicial reversal of objectionable legal doctrine. R. 
EPSTEIN, supra note 302, at 306-07, 329; Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 
1387, 1387, 1454-55 (1987). 
308. See Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Power~. 85 MICH. L. REV. 592, 602 
(1986). 
309. for modern expositions of this view, see, e.g., J. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY (1963); Cutler, 
To Form a Government, 59 foREIGN AFF. 126 ( 1980). Similar conceptions undergirded the Progressive critique of 
American politics developed most conspicuously by Woodrow Wilson. See J. Tuus, supra note 66, at 119-24; see 
also Mahoney, A Newer Science of Politics: The Federalist and American Political Science in the Progressive 
Era, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION, supra note 64, at 250, 251-61. 
310. Several statutes passed .during this period exemplify Congress' efforts to reassert its powers. See, e.g., 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as 
amended in scatiered sections of 2 U.S.C. (1988)); War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 
(l973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1982)). For a skeptical view of these efforts, see E. DREW, supra 
note 80, at 9-10. 
·' I 
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protect public health and safety. 311 Thus, committed advocates of contrasting 
substantive political visions might find it advantageous not to have separation of 
powers disputes resolved by the courts because short-term judicial victories for 
one side might have sobering longer-term implications when the other side con-
trols the government.312 
Third, and most significantly, reliance upon the political process to resolve 
most separation of powers disputes recognizes that an effective government re-
quires a degree of interbranch comity that is inconsistent with frequent resort to 
the judicial process. Despite the importance of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate on public issues,313 our system rests upon unexpressed understand-
ings and an uncodified but shared sense of limits.314 Understandings are unex-
pressed and the sense of limits is shared but uncodified because participants in 
the political process recognize the need to avoid open warfare and because both 
structural and institutional factors dampen the inevitable conflicts that do 
arise.315 
Judicial opinions, on the other hand, raise the stakes of any particular con-
flict by clearly identifying winners and losers through formal explanations that 
presumably will control other analytically related disputes.316 The prospect of 
litigation creates incentives to assert maximum positions for short-term advan-
tage in court and to characterize opposing views as illegitimate. 317 In situations 
where the Constitution provides no determinative answer, Congress and the 
President would do better to seek to resolve their separation of powers disputes 
by negotiating them in good faith than to depend upon the judiciary as other 
than a last resort. Negotiated resolutions of specific disagreements can decide 
smaller questions in ways that create a foundation for similarly informal ar-
rangements of future interbranch differences while recognizing the contrasting 
interests of the governmental institutions involved. 318 
311. All three of these cases were argued in the Supreme Court by Alan Morrison, director of litigation at 
Public Citizen, Inc., a public-interest organization founded by Ralph Nader that favors more vigorous government 
regulation. Morrison agreed to take these cases for the reasons described in the text. B. CRAIG, supra note 112, at 
61-65; Elliott, supra note 159, at 319 n.l2. 
312. For example, a conservative journalist recently warned that admirers of Ronald Reagan who advocate a 
strong presidency as a bulwark against intrusive actions by an unsympathetic Congress should consider the impli-
cations of giving similar powers to a liberal chief executive when political fashions change. Francis, Imperial 
Conservatives?, NAT'L REv., Aug. 4, 1989, at 37. 
313. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
314. See, e.g., E. DREW, supra note 80, at 9; Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. 
REv. 371, 391 (1976). This is a lesson that some notably unsuccessful recent Presidents, especially Richard Nixon 
and Jimmy Carter, failed to learn. N. POLSBY, supra note 294, at 45, 49-50, 66. 
315. SeeN. PoLSBY, supra note 294, at 206-09. 
316. R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 18-22 ( 1989). Professor Nagel probably would not agree with 
the suggestion that separation of powers disputes are generally better handled outside the judicial system. See 
Nagel, A Comment on the Rule of Law Model of Separation of Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 355, 360-62 
(1989) (criticizing functionalist arguments supporting the result in Morrison); but see id. at 363-64 (warning 
against the dangers of "[d]octrinaire enforcement of the theory of separation of powers"). 
317. R. NAGEL, supra note 316, at20-21; Shane, Legal Disagreement in a Government of Laws: The Case of 
Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 464-65, 492, 501-14 (1987). 
318. The procedural details for accomplishing interbranch negotiations are beyond the scope of this article. 
For a suggested framework for handling executive privilege disputes, see Shane, supra note 317, at 516-40. 
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Some might object to this approach on the ground that it will undermine 
the rule of law by facilitating interbranch power grabs. Yet our political history 
teaches that "an excessive force in one direction is apt to produce a correspond-
ing counter force. "319 This is the lesson not only of the controversies over the 
Tenure of Office Act and of Watergate, but also of most of our political history. 
Overreaching by one of the political branches typically begets reassertion by the 
other. 320 To be sure, the relative powers of Congress and the President would 
change over time if interbranch disputes were generally negotiated rather than 
litigated, 321 but the relative powers of the political branches have changed dra-
matically anyway.322 In any event, the argument here does not preclude judicial 
resolution of separation of powers issues. Instead, it simply urges Congress and 
the President to avoid excessive reliance upon that practice. Courts would still 
be available to address properly presented legal claims. The point is only that 
most such claims are more appropriately addressed in nonjudicial forums. 323 
319. Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term-Foreword: On Preside/Ilia/ Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REv. 13, 
20 (1974). 
320. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 5!9, 532 (1987); Karl, supra note 110, at 34; Pierce, 
Political Accountabi/icy and Delegated Power: A Response co Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 391, 405-06 
(1987). 
Indeed, the reassertion itself may represent an alternative form of overreaching in the absence of the neces-
sary interbranch comity. For example, Congress became enamored of the legislative veto as a means for control-
ling substantive administrative rules during the Nixon administration, when the relationship between the legisla-
tive and executive branches was especially bitter. Approximately 80% of the more than 200 bills containing 
legislative vetoes enacted between 1950 and 1976 were approved from 1970 onward. N. PoLSBY, supra note 294, 
at 237 n.\22 (citing Cooper & Hurley, The Legis/acive Vera: A Policy Analysis, 10 CoNG. & PRESIDENCY 1 
(1983)). 
321. SeeR. NAGEL, supra note 316, at 22. 
322. In both relative and absolute terms, the presidency has become consid~rably stronger than Congress. 
Except for foreign affairs, early Presidents played a comparatively minor role. Andrew Jackson seized the initia-
tive from Congress on a number of fronts, generating intense controversy in the process. Jackson was followed by 
a series of weaker chief executives until Abraham Lincoln, who held office during a period of unprecedented 
national crisis. See generally E. HARGROVE & M. NELSON. PRESIDENTS, POLITICS, AND PoLICY 45-50 (1984). 
Since the Civil War, the federal government has undertaken vastly increased responsibilities. In the latter 
pan of the nineteenth century, Congress predominated, often with presidential acquiescence. The twentieth cen-
tury has seen cycles of more active executive leadership interspersed with periods of congressional ascendancy. !d. 
at 49-50; B. KARL, EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION AND REFORM IN THE NEW DEAL 30-31, 34-35, 166-68, 186-87 
{ 1963); H. LASKI, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 127-37 (1940). The balance began moving toward the White 
House under Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, with a less activist interlude between them under William 
Howard Taft. Wilson was succeeded by weaker Presidents until Franklin D. Roosevelt seemingly altered the 
congressional-executive balance permanently. The perceived excesses of subsequent Presidents, particularly Lyn-
don Johnson and Richard Nixon, in turn gave rise to fears of executive domination. Indeed, some of the most 
vocal critics of executive power had been celebrants of the rise of the presidency at the expense of Congress in 
earlier years. See, e.g., A. ScHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). Th~ difficulties of Gerald Ford 
and Jimmy Carter, by contrast, prompted many observers to wonder whether the institution of the presidency had 
become too weak, a concern that has been much subordinated by the apparent success of Ronald Reagan. See, 
e.g., Greenstein, The Need for an Early Appraisal of che Reagan Presidency, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY 1, 6-7 
(F. Greenstein ed. 1983); Reeves, The !deo/ogical Election, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1984, § 6 (Magazine), at 26, 
29. Bur see Lowi, Ronald Reagan-Revo/ueionary?, in THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY AND THE GOVERNING OF 
AMERICA 29, 47-48 (L. Salamon & M. Lund eds. 1985). 
323. An episode of a different sort illustrates the point. The apparent success of negative campaigning by 
independent organizations such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee in 1980 enabled some 
targets of NCPAC attacks in 1982 to generate sympathy and made it easier for them to raise campaign funds. A 
striking example occurred in Maryland, where the Republican challenger to Senator Paul Sarbanes pleaded un-
successfully with the organization to tone down its advertisements or withdraw from the state altogether. See 
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C. Bringing Political Judgment Back In: The Need for Wisdom 
Forbearing to litigate inter branch separation of powers disputes offers 
final benefit. Because participants in such disputes would have less incentiv:~e 
jockey for advantage in judicial proceedings, they might devote more attenti 0 
to the wisdom of controversial proposals. Courts determine only the constit~~ 
tionality, not the wisdom, of a statute or practice.324 Professor Nathanson re-
minded us that "the debate over . . . desirability . . . need not be conducted 
entirely on the constitutional level, and that a Supreme Court decision rejecting 
a constitutional challenge should not be interpreted as a vindication of 
practical value . . .. " 325 This reminder has particular relevance to the p~li~; 
innovations that gave rise to the recent separation of powers jurisprudence. 
Some of those innovations, whatever their constitutionality, were of dubious wis-
dom. That mundane point was frequently overlooked in the loftier legal and 
academic debate over Chadha, Bowsher, Morrison, and other Supreme Court 
cases. 
Consider the legislative veto. That device quite properly has been criticized 
for skewing the administrative process in subtle but potentially important ways. 
In particular, the legislative veto tended to bias the process against regulation 
by giving members of Congress the opportunity to reject a specific proposal 
without having to weigh alternatives, confer advantages upon economically pow-
erful trade and industry groups which have the resources to oppose regulations 
both at the agency and on Capitol Hill, encourage broad delegations, and in-
crease the risk of political impasse between regulators and legislators.326 
Whatever the constitutionality of the veto, these characteristics provide poten-
tially powerful arguments against the desirability of the device as a means of 
controlling administrative discretion. Those arguments do not depend upon hy-
pothetical comparisons with other congressional devices for preventing agency 
overreaching; they address the wisdom of the legislative veto on its own 
terms. 327 Moreover, if the legislative veto were applied as broadly as many of its 
Leatherberry. Rethinking Regulation of Independent Expenditures by PACs, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 13, 27 & 
nn.81-82 ( 1984). 
This episode suggests that the adverse impact of a Supreme Court ruling upholding the constitutionality of 
the so-called regulatory legislative veto might well have been less than veto opponents feared. The principal benefi· 
ciaries of such a ruling would have been politically well-connected interests such as used-car dealers and funeral 
directors, whose generous campaign contributions were widely noted. Such groups probably would have overplayed 
their hand before long, thereby generating a political backlash that would have made it more difficult for those 
groups to prevail in Congress because many legislators would fear criticism for having been "bought" by special 
interest groups. 
324. See. e.g .. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 712 (1986); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 973 (1982); 
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 ( 1961 ); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 
(1955); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 550-51 (1949); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 ( 1934). 
325. Nathanson, supra note 110, at 1091. Professor Nathanson made this point in a discussion of the legisla-
tive veto, but his suggestion apparently was too subtle for some readers who characterized his reluctance to invali-
date the veto as showing his "generally favorable" disposition toward its desirability. See Immigration & Natural-
ization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 976 n.l2 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); Martin, supra note 134, at 255 
n.5. 
326. See supra text accompanying notes 110 & 134. 
327. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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enthusiasts proposed, Congress could quickly find itself overwhelmed by the 
task of reviewing agency regulations. 328 Even if it is constitutional, then, the 
legislative veto is a bad idea that would create more problems than it would 
solve. 
Similarly, the abstract debate over the Comptroller General's alleged sub-
servience to Congress diverted attention from the fundamental flaws of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings as a means for reducing the budget deficit. At the most basic 
level, the statute rests upon controversial economic assumptions concerning the 
adverse effects of deficits. 329 Even accepting the underlying premise that current 
budgetary shortfalls have reached unacceptable levels, however, Gramm-Rud-
man-Holiings had numerous defects. First, it contained no sanction if the fed-
eral government actually exceeded the annual deficit limit; the statutory targets 
applied only to the projected deficit at the beginning of the fiscal year.m More 
significantly, nothing in the law required that the projected deficit be based 
upon realistic economic assumptions or that the political branches avoid the 
most blatant accounting gimmicks to avoid triggering the sequestration process. 
Consequently, the measures taken to reduce the projected deficit frequently 
have strained credulity. 331 These defects do not necessarily mean that Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings should have been defeated. Nevertheless, these were the real 
problems presented by the statute. The role of the Comptroller General was 
peripheral. 
Finally, the litigation over the constitutionality of the independent counsel 
obscured other troublesome questions about the Ethics in Government Act. 
First, by requiring an outside investigation of credible allegations of criminal 
wrongdoing against high-level executive officials, the statute presumes that the 
328. This daunting prospect played an important role in the defeat of bills that would have created so-called 
generic legislative vetoes in the years before the Chadha decision. See B. CRAIG, supra note 112, at 49-50, 56-57. 
At the same time, neither the Supreme Court's invalidation of the legislative veto in Chadha nor the general 
undesirability of the device has prevented its reappearance in a large number of statutes since 1983. Congress has 
enacted more than I 00 such provisions despite the seemingly unambiguous judicial condemnation of the practice. 
Almost all of these new vetoes appear in appropriations bills and give the power to disapprove proposed expendi-
tures to committees or even to subcommittees. Despite presidential objections, the executive branch has acquiesced 
tn these arrangements because they afford useful flexibility. See L. FISHER. THE PoLITICS OF SHARED PoWER 102-
03 (2d ed. 1987); Strauss, supra note 304, at 446 n.63. 
329. Gramm-Rudman-Hollings rests upon the notion that deficits are unmitigated evils. Many economists, 
however, reject this concept and believe that a single-minded campaign to reduce the deficit can do more harm 
than good. See, e.g., R. EISNER, supra note 306, at 161-64; Stith, supra note 150, at 638~39. 
3 30. Kuttner, The Fudge Factor, NEw REPUBLIC, June 19, 1989, at 22, 23. Moreover, both the original 
verSion of the statute and the 1987 revisions passed in response to the ruling in Bowsher specifically limited the 
stze ~r any sequestration order for the fiscal year during which these measures were enacted, even though these 
prov151005 prevented attainment of the deficit target for those years. See Stith, supra note 150, at 629-30. 
33 1. Among the devices that have been used to bring projected deficits into compliance with Gramm-Rud-
man-Hollin · . 
ass . gs are postpomng payments from the last day of one fiscal year to the first day of the followmg one, 
ca ummg htgher rates of economic growth and lower rates of inflation than predicted by reputable private fore-
th:t:"·. selling off government assets, and removing items likely to contribute substantially to the deficit (such as 
fRt avmgs-and-loan relief program and, in the current year, the Postal Service) "off budget" in whole or part. B. 
A !EDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING 278-79 (1988); Domenici, The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Process: An 
c tn Legis/ r F .1. Hot/· a Ive u11 tty?, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 540 (1988); Downey, The Futility of Gramm-Rudman-
tngs 25 H J 1989 ' ARV. ·ON LEGIS. 545, 548-49 (1988); Drew, Letter from Washington, NEW YORKER, May 15, 
.at879I·F'd . 330 
2 
• • ne man, A Deft ell of Courage, N.Y. REv. BooKs, June 1, 1989, at 23, 26; Kuttner, supra note 
• at 2-23. 
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professional staff of the Department of Justice is incapable of dispassionately 
handling sensitive cases. To be sure, the Department performed inadequately 
during Watergate. Ironically, the Ethics Act, which was passed to restore public 
confidence in government, subtly undermines that goal by the presumption of 
governmental incompetence upon which the independent counsel provision rests. 
Perhaps this unintended consequence does not outweigh the benefits of avoiding 
perceived conflicts of interest, but that question apparently got lost in the con-
stitutional rhetoric. Second, despite its name, the Ethics Act emphasizes crimi-
nality rather than ethical impropriety. Accordingly, targets of investigations by 
independent counsel routinely proclaim themselves vindicated if the counsel 
does not seek an indictment.332 Surely we should expect public officials to aspire 
to higher standards of conduct than "Never Been Indicted."333 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Constitution is more than "what the judges say it is."334 That docu-
ment provides the framework for our government and our politics. It is, in short, 
an important part of our culture as well as of our law.335 Accordingly, the Con-
stitution derives its meaning not only from judicial interpretation but also from 
shared understandings that emerge from governance and politics. This fact sug-
gests that not every dispute over the appropriate division of authority between 
Congress and the President requires judicial resolution. Instead, the political 
branches themselves have resources and obligations to develop their own views 
and to fashion accommodations of their sometimes conflicting interests. More-
over, just as the Constitution might not apply in a determinative way to particu-
lar interbranch disputes, sometimes the wisdom of a proposed statute or policy 
is more important than its constitutionality. Both politicians and citizens too 
often forget this mundane point. 
This view of the separation of powers assumes a minimum level of inter-
branch comity. The present political situation affords few grounds for optimism. 
For most of the past generation, we have had a divided federal government, 
with one party controlling the legislative branch and the other controlling the 
executive. In addition, each branch has developed sophisticated legal staffs 
which seek vigilantly to safeguard their constitutional prerogatives.336 For these 
and other reasons, powerful incentives exist for conflict rather than coopera-
332. Carter, supra note 199, at 139. Not only the targets of such investigations adopt this rhetorical posture; 
Presidents do, too. See The President's News Conference, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 255, 258 (1988) ("no 
attention is paid to the fact of how many (targets of independent counsel investigations], when it actually came to 
trial, [were] found totally to be innocent"). 
333. C. TR!LLIN, The Motto-Maker's Art, in IF You CAN'T SAY SOMETHING NICE 11, 11-12, 14 (1987). See 
also Carter, supra note 199, at 139. 
334. L. FISHER, supra note 279, at 245 (quoting ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 139 
(1908)). 
335. SeeS. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988). 
336. See Miller, supra note 79, at 412-26. 
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tion. 337 Even when those obstacles are overcome, the quality of interbranch con-
stitutional debate might disappoint aficionados of judicial interpretation. 338 
Regardless of the current outlook, however, the approach suggested here 
comports with the constitutional design for a government characterized by both 
liberty and efficiency. The unlikelihood that this approach will be adopted sim-
ply proves that the Constitution affords the necessary, but not sufficient, condi-
tions for such a government. 339 
. 337. The unwillingness . b'l' f h I' . I d h . tl' . b d . 
onlios led 1 or ma I tty o t e po tllca branches to accommo ate t etr con tcttng u getary pn-
158·60· C ~.;assage of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings with all of its inadequacies. See R. EISNER, supra note 306, at 
' · "EBBER & A· W 
610-12 (1986)· S . · ILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 
lll<nlhal & T 'Edchnetder, The Political Legacy of the Reagan Years, in THE REAGAN LEGACY 51, 85 (S. Blu-
338 S · sail eds. 1988). 
2! GA. L. ;:~ •·;·· Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and Its Power to Counter Judicial Doctrine, 
N.C.L. REV 587 7(• 98-IOI (1986); Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 3)9 s 1983). 
· ee D M 
Rnotun0N 301 3~;'NIHAN, The "New Science of Politics" and the Old Art of Governing, in CAME THE 
' ( 1988); J. Tuus, supra note 66, at 42. 
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